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A NEW BALANCE OF EVILS:
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, IQBAL,
AND THE END OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Mark C. Niles t
Criminal prosecutors wield immense power in the criminaljustice system.
While the majority of prosecutorsexercise this power in a professional manner,
there is compelling evidence of a serious and growing problem ofprosecutorial
misconduct in this country. Although much prosecutorialmisconduct results in the
violation of the constitutional and other legal rights of criminal defendants,
prosecutorsareprotectedfrom any liabilityarisingfrom these violations in all but
the most exceptional cases by the defense ofabsolute immunity. The US. Supreme
Courthas justifiedthe applicationofabsoluteprosecutorialimmunity, in part, by
noting that other means of incentivizing appropriateprosecutorialconduct exist,
namely criminal prosecution and professional sanction. This Article briefly
documents the extent of the problem ofprosecutorialmisconduct in this country
and the complete ineffectiveness of non-civil liability mechanismsfor controlling
it. It argues that absolute immunity is an excessive protectionfor prosecutorsand
that qualifiedimmunity, which limits the liabilityofprosecutors to instances where
they have violated an objectively clear constitutionalright, is sufficient to serve the
policy objectives that absolute immunity was created to protect. This Article
discusses the sufficiency of qualified immunity in the new context of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and the standardit announcedfor
legalsufficiency for civil rights claimsfiled againstprosecutors. This new standard
was expressly designed to make it easier to dismissfactually weak claims against
prosecutors thereby removing one of the centraljustificationsfor the absolute
immunity defense appliedby courtsfor decades in light of the previous, and more
lenient, sufficiency standardarticulatedby the Court in Conley v. Gibson. Because
qualified immunity is a sufficient liabilityprotectionforprosecutors (particularly
in the post-Iqbal federal court system) the harsh and unjust defense of absolute
immunityfor prosecutorsshould be eliminated.

Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law B.A.,
Wesleyan University, 1988; J.D., Stanford University, 1991. 1 would like to thank my
colleagues Angela Davis, Paul Figley, Cynthia Jones, Benjamin Leff, and Jenny Roberts for
reviewing drafts of this piece and otherwise supporting the project. I would also like to thank
my conscientious and diligent research assistants Nathan Roy, Austin Egan and Nadeen
Saqer for their help.
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"No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the
government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are
bound to obey it."'
"It was indeed the purpose of this civil rights legislation to secure federal
rights against invasion by officers and agents of the states. I see no reason why
any officer of government should be higher than the Constitution from which all
rights and privileges of an office obtain." 2
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INTRODUCTION

During the early years of World War II, a French immigrant named Armand
Gregoire was arrested on the false grounds that he was a German national and,
therefore, an "enemy alien." 3 Although Gregoire's true nationality was soon
confirmed at a hearing before the Enemy Alien Hearing Board he was
nonetheless incarcerated from January 5, 1942 until after the war was over in
1946.4 Gregoire subsequently filed an action in United States District Court
against several federal officials, including two past Attorneys General of the
United States, alleging that his arrest and imprisonment were "without any
authority of law and without any reasonable or colorable cause" and that
1.
2.
3.
4.

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 369, 383 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id.
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defendants "conspired together and maliciously and willfully entered into a
scheme to deprive the plaintiff of his liberty contrary to law." 5 The trial judge
held that the defendants' unlawful acts "had been induced only by personal illwill" but concluded that the defendants had an "absolute immunity from
liability" and granted their motion to dismiss.6
In his opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle, Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand
was demonstrably outraged by the circumstances of the case but nonetheless
affirmed the lower court's order, explaining:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries
he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints
to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing
so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the
guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the
unflinching discharge of their duties. . . . As is so often the case, the answer
must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In
this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty
7
to the constant dread of retaliation.
In the almost 75 years since Hand's decision, courts have repeatedly reached
the same conclusion 8 when adjudicating civil claims alleging the most egregious
intentional misconduct on the part of prosecutors (including intentionally
withholding exculpatory evidence,' conspiring to present false testimony,"o

5. Id. ("The second count reiterated these allegations and added that the defendants
'subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of his liberty and of his rights, privileges and
immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,' and deprived him

of equal protection of the law in violation of Sections 43 and 47 of Civil Rights Act.").
6. Id.
7. Id. at 581. This characterization of the extent of official immunity was not
uncontroversial at the time Hand issued his opinion. See Karen Lin, An Unintended Double
Standardof Liability: The Effect of the Westfall Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM.
L. REv. 1718, 1724 (2008) ("Other courts, however, rejected such a broad rule in favor of
case-by-case analysis and balancing of the competing individual and public interests at
stake.").
8. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REv. 225,

269 (2009) ("In 1949, Judge Learned Hand wrote a path-marking opinion on official immunity
in Gregoire... [providing] the basis for the Supreme Court's twentieth-century resurrection
of immunity doctrines based on concern about the possible chilling of official action in all
areas, not just national security.").
9. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 431 (1976) (stating that non-disclosure
of exculpatory information is reprehensible, but nonetheless protected by absolute immunity);

see also Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2010).
10. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 839 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that a prosecutor who
used false testimony before a grand jury was absolutely immune for both the testimony itself

140

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [XIII:137

knowingly offering perjured testimony," to name just a few1 2 ): that all
prosecutors, regardless of the extent of their intentional or reckless misconduct,
must be immune from any civil judgment arising out of the performance of their
official adversarial duties1 3 because the procedural and substantive burdens
associated with such claims would "dampen the ardor" of honest officials "in the

unflinching discharge of their duties."1 4
Perhaps it goes without saying, particularly in his distinguished case,15 that

and the alleged pre-indictment conspiracy to present false testimony).

11. Id. at 839; Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840-41 (3d Cir. 1976).
12. See Margaret Z. Johns, ReconsideringAbsolute ProsecutorialImmunity, 2005 BYU
L. REV. 53, 61 (2005). Professor Johns referenced a 1999 study by the Chicago Tribune that
noted that prosecutors "have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the real killers were white.
They have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her husband committed suicide. They have
prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their daughter was killed by wild dogs." Id. (citing
Kenneth Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error:How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice
to
Win (Part 1: The
Verdict: Dishonor), CHI. TRIB.
(Jan.
11,
1999),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial I -story.html).
13. See Anthony J. Luppino, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial
Immunity, 34 STAN. L. REV. 487, 487-88 ("Prosecutors sued for damages under section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 obtain varying degrees of immunity depending upon the
function they are performing when they commit the allegedly violative acts. For 'quasijudicial' acts-those closely related to the adjudicative process of the criminal justice
system-prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability. For investigative and
administrative acts, prosecutors accused of misconduct have generally received only qualified
immunity."); see also Veronica Zhang, Throwing the Defendant in the Snakepit: Applying a
State-CreatedDangerAnalysis to ProsecutorialFabricationof Evidence, 91 B.U. L. REV.
2131, 2138-44 (2011) (discussing the functional distinction in prosecutorial immunity and the
policy reasons given by courts to justify it).
14. See Laure Oren, Immunity andAccountabilityin Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should
Pay?, 50 U. Pirr. L. REV. 935, n.153 ("The single most influential opinion, however, was
Judge Learned Hand's decision in Gregoire. . . . Judge Hand ruled that, regardless of any
allegations of malice, various federal officials were absolutely immune for their acts ... [and]
penned a justification of the absolute defense in language which has been cited ever since by
both federal and state courts. The essence of that justification was the necessity of sparing the

officials from the chilling effect of the hazards of litigation.").
15. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE, at xv (Oxford

Univ. Press 2d ed. 2011) ("Learned Hand is numbered among the small group of truly great
American judges of the twentieth century, a group that included Oliver Wendell Holms, Jr.,

Lois Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo.").
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Judge Learned Hand 6 had a point. Shocking" or even tragic'" as the
circumstances of an individual case of intentional prosecutorial abuse might be,
there are broader societal interests to be considered beyond the potential for
monetary compensation for the injured party.1 9 The availability of a civil action
against a prosecutor even for her intentional acts would be problematic,
16. See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.

1923). Earlier in his

illustrious career, Judge Hand had expressed his belief that the criminal justice system was
balanced inappropriately in favor of the accused, particularly in regard to procedure including
discovery rules, and dismissing the legitimate possibility of erroneous conviction: "Under our
criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to
the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. . . . Our procedure has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we
need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and
defeats the prosecution of crime." Id.
17. See Charlie Savage & Michael Schmidt, Inner Workings ofSenator's Troubled Trial
Detailed,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(Mar.
15,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/us/politics/report-details-inner-workings-of-troubledethics-trial-of-senator-ted-stevens.html?_r-0 ("At least two federal prosecutors involved in
the botched ethics trial of the late Senator Ted Stevens 'intentionally withheld and concealed'
significant evidence from the defense team that could have resulted in his acquittal.... [T]he
government's chief witness against Mr. Stevens, William J. Allen, had made statements to
prosecutors that conflicted with his testimony at the trial. The prosecution team did not turn
over to the defense information about the earlier conversations." (quoting a court-appointed
investigator)).
PROJECT,
INNOCENCE
Morton,
18. Michael
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/michael-morton/ ("After spending nearly 25 years in
prison for the murder of his wife, [Michael] Morton was released on October 4, 2011, and
officially exonerated in December 2011. . . . During the course of the post-conviction DNA
litigation, Morton's attorneys filed a Public Information Act request, and finally obtained the
other documents showing Morton's innocence in the prosecution's file that had been withheld
at trial.. .. The Court of Inquiry ruled there to be probable cause to believe Mr. Anderson had
violated criminal laws by concealing evidence and charged him with criminal contempt. The

State Bar of Texas also brought ethics charges against Mr. Anderson. In early November 2013,
Mr. Anderson entered a plea to criminal contempt and agreed to serve a 10-day jail sentence.
He resigned from his position as a district court judge and permanently surrendered his law

license.") (last visited June 2, 2017).
19. See John P. Taddei, Beyond Absolute Immunity: Alternative Protections for
ProsecutorsAgainst Ultimate Liabilityfor § 1983 Suits, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1883, 1902 (2012)
("At its most abstract, the core rationale for absolute prosecutorial immunity is that it best
promotes the 'broader public interest.' It is based on a concern that the possibility of personal
liability will have a chilling effect on a prosecutor's performance of his duties and hamper his
independence: If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of § 1983 suits would
undermine performance of his duties no less than would the threat of common-law suits for

malicious prosecution." (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976))); see also
Megan M. Rose, The Endurance ofProsecutorialImmunity-How the FederalCourts Vitiated

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 37 B.C. L. REv. 1019, 1026-27 (1996) ("The policy justifications
underlying these early grants of absolute immunity varied. Some courts have described
prosecutorial immunity as quasi-judicial. Judicial immunity for acts within the judge's
jurisdiction can be traced to the early English common law, as can the immunity of grand
jurors. These courts reason that judges, grand jurors and prosecutors all perform the
discretionary function of evaluating evidence presented to them.").
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according to Hand, first, because while Gregoire's claim was apparently valid,
not all allegations of prosecutorial misconduct will be truthful, and second,
because prosecutors will be forced to respond to all such claims (valid or not)
taking up valuable time managing the "burdens" of litigation, 20 and potentially
(but presumably only in response to the valid claims) paying extensive out of
pocket awards to successful plaintiffs. 2 1 Encumbered by these burdens,
prosecutors would be unable to participate effectively in the criminal justice
system. 22 It is this consequence, and its broader social cost, that Hand balances
against the uncompensated injuries of the victims of the actions of a malicious
prosecutor. He concludes, as courts in the U.S. all but invariably have since
Gregoire, that the preservation of effective prosecutorial function is more
important than compensation for injured parties, and that the only way to assure
this effectiveness is to shield prosecutors from liability no matter how egregious
or intentional their misconduct. 23
It is important to note that notwithstanding his decision in the case and the
balance he reluctantly applies, Hand characterizes the action of the prosecutor
there as an "evil," one for which he "should not escape liability" and that it is
"monstrous" for a court to deny recovery in such an instance. Hand says that
prosecutors should be subject to civil liability for their intentional misconduct,
and that if offending prosecutors could be efficiently identified, our justice
system would be obliged to compensate the victims of their actions in the same
way it compensates others injured by intentional torts. 24 The problem that
mandates Hand's balance is that the validity of the allegations against
prosecutors cannot be determined without forcing the defendant ("guilty" or not)
to suffer the significant burden posed by even the most frivolous of lawsuits.
Perhaps Hand's balance, therefore, was not about the appropriate scope of
prosecutorial liability so much as it was about the nature and inherent burdens of

20. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
21. Judicial presumptions in Gregoireregarding the dramatic impact of potential civil
damage awards on actual prosecutors may be exaggerated, or at least overstated with time.
The reality of civil liability for claims arising from the official acts of prosecutors is complex.
See Taddei, supra note 19, at 1887 ("[S]tates and local municipalities have created a number
ofprotections for public officials, including prosecutors-such as indemnification legislation,
private insurance, and other alternative liability mechanism-to cover losses from torts they
commit in the line of duty. These protections prevent prosecutors from shouldering the burden
of personal financial liability even in instances in which they cannot don the cloak of absolute
immunity.").
22. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23 ("The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based
upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand

jurors acting within the scope of their duties.").
23. See Id. at 422-24.
24. Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 582. See generally John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century
Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521 (2003) ("The most influential torts scholars in the
Twentieth Century form a diverse group whose thoughts may be placed under the banner of
compensation-deterrence theory.").
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our civil litigation system.
Eight years after Hand's decision in Gregoire, the Supreme Court in Conley
v. Gibson2 5 confirmed the sufficiency standard for claims filed in federal courtthe rule for what must be included in a complaint in order for it to survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 26 In response the
defendant's contention that the plaintiffs' complaint "failed to set forth specific
facts to support its general allegations," Justice Black held that "the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short
and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."2 7 While this is a fair
and non-controversial reading 8 of the language of Rule 8,29 and one relied upon
by courts routinely for half a century, 30 it provides for the kind of litigationrelated burden that Hand identified as arising from claims filed against
prosecutors by allowing all but the most frivolous claims to move to the
discovery stage of litigation and its exponential increase in costs and related
burdens. 31 And it is. all but universally accepted that the discovery burden has
25. 355 U.S. 41, 42 (1957).

.

26. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must
be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following
defenses by motion . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . .

27. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
28. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 575-76 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea was not to
keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in. The merits of a claim would be sorted
out during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible of trial. . . . But
the bare allegation suffices under a system that 'restrict[s] the pleadings to the task of general
notice-giving and invest[s] the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation

for trial. . . ." (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947))).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already
has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the
relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.").
30. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If Conley's 'no set of facts'
language is to be interred, let it not be without a eulogy. That exact language, which the
majority says has 'puzzled the profession for 50 years,' has been cited as authority in a dozen
opinions of this Court and four separate writings. In not one of those 16 opinions was the
language 'questioned,' 'criticized,' or 'explained away.' Indeed, today's opinion is the first by
a Member of this Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formation.").
31. Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 466 (1994) ("The problem of excessive discovery seems reasonably
straightforward. Discovery rules are designed to enable a party to force others, parties and
nonparties, to disclose information. The inquiring party does not bear all the costs of the
process. The costs of responding, which include interpreting the demand, gathering the
information, and formulating and delivering a response, are bome by the responding party.");
see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("[I]t is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse
cannot be solved by 'careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judge stage,' much less
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grown even more onerous in the decades since both Conley and Gregoire.32
But what if there was another way to address the litigation-related burdens
on prosecutors other than a blanket immunity protection? What if baseless claims
against prosecutors could be dismissed all but immediately and without
measurable procedural burdens? Would Hand's balance of evils require a
recalibration? Would the diminished burden on the prosecutor, as compared to
the "monstrous evil" of uncompensated injury he or she has caused to an
individual, suggest a reconsideration of absolute prosecutorial immunity?
Particularly if there was a form of immunity that was better tailored to distinguish
prosecutors who act reasonably from those who engage in reckless or intentional
misconduct?
Part I of this paper provides a brief survey of the frightening epidemic of
prosecutorial misconduct and of the utter ineffectiveness of mechanisms (other
than civil liability) designed to prevent or at least control it.33 Part II provides a
summary of the development and application of the defense of absolute
immunity for prosecutors for litigation-related actions taken in the course of their
official duties. 34 It notes the central policy basis for the application of this
dramatic blanket preclusion of liability, a set of related concerns that Judge Hand
articulated in Gregoire and that I have previously referred to as "nuisance"
concerns.35 The related concerns are that threatening prosecutors with potential

'lucid instructions to juries'; the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings." (citation omitted)).
32. For a discussion of widespread dissatisfaction with federal discovery practice in the
second half of the 20th Century see George Shepherd, Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal
and Why Broad PretrialDiscovery Should Be FurtherEliminated, 49 IND. L. REv. 465, 478
("[In Twombly and Iqbal] the Supreme Court recognized that the decades of tinkering with the
[discovery] rules had not worked. Despite all the rule changes, discovery abuse was still
pervasive. So the Supreme Court effectively eliminated discovery in many cases.")
33. See H. Mitchell Caldwell, The ProsecutorPrince: Misconduct, Accountability, and
a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REv. 51, 55 (2013) ("Academics and practitioners
considering the problem of punishing prosecutorial misconduct agree that the disciplinary
measures in place are grossly inadequate.").
34. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for ConstitutionalTorts, 99 VA. L. REv. 207,
207-08 (2013) ("There is no liability rule for constitutional torts. There are, rather, several
different liability rules, ranging from absolute immunity at one extreme to absolute liability at
the other. The choice among them does not depend, as the proverbial Martian might expect,
on the role of money damages in enforcing particular rights. The right being enforced is
irrelevant to constitutional tort doctrine. What matters instead is the identity of the defendant
or the act she performs.").
35. See Mark C. Niles, "Nothing but Mischief": The Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Scope of DiscretionaryImmunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1275, 1309-10 (2002) ("There are two
related, but distinct distracting impacts produced by the threat of tort liability. First, the more
critical and potentially debilitating form, which I call 'complex' nuisance, involves the impact
that exercising their authority, or exercising it in a certain way, would have on their possible
exposure to substantial civil liability. The central concern raised by this potentiality is that the
threat of liability will induce government officials to make decisions based on the relevant and
applicable policy objectives that should be governing the execution of their authority, but
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civil liability in multiple cases will distract them from their duties ("simple"
nuisance) and alter the motivations that inform their decision-making process
("complex" nuisance). 36 "Simple" nuisance involves the fear that prosecutors
will be such obvious targets for frivolous civil lawsuits that they will be
inundated and will be severely handicapped in performing their core functions.
"Complex" nuisance is the concern that the fear of potential liability will lead
prosecutors to alter the performance of their duties and not act with the
appropriate force and zeal for the fear that they would be exposed to potentially
catastrophic financial consequences."
Part III argues that in light of the Supreme Court's replacement of the
"sufficiency" requirement for FRCP 8(a)(c) with the "plausibility" requirement
for pleading in the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley38 and Ashcroft v. IqbaP9
cases, absolute immunity is unnecessary (at least as a remedy for simple
nuisance) given the drastically diminishing likelihood that factually weak claims
will reach the discovery stage of litigation.40 The complex nuisance concern
cannot provide a justification for absolute immunity for willful or reckless
prosecutorial misconduct. The strong societal interest in discouraging such
conduct and the availability of an alternative defense-qualified immunity
(which shields a government official from civil liability when s/he has acted
reasonably in securing an established Constitutional right)-protects prosecutors
from the kind of perverse incentives that would distract them from the vigorous
performance of their duties.4 1 The obsolescence of absolute immunity for
prosecutors is cemented by the development of the qualified immunity defense

based rather on a concern for self-preservation. . . . The related nuisance factor, which I will
call 'simple' nuisance, deals with the costs, in the form of expenditure of limited time and
resources, that society bears when its government is involved in civil litigation.... [C]ourts
have consistently held that liability for discretionary government acts should be limited
because of the practical impact that litigation-and its multifarious procedural necessitieshas on the ability of government officials to do their jobs.").
36. See id at 1307-12; see also Carissa Hessick, ProsecutorialSubornation of Perjury:
Is the FairJusticeAgency the Solution We Have Been Looking For?, 47 S.D. L. REv. 255, 260
(2002) ("The argument that sanctions will have a chilling effect on prosecutors is more
difficult to oppose. Each time a system of incentives is created, an effect on parties' behavior
can be observed. The extent to which those disincentives will extend beyond the behavior that
is sought to be discouraged is not easily measured." (citation omitted)).
37. See Niles, supra note 35, at 1309-10.
38. 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
39. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
40. See Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and ProceduralJudicialActivism, 37 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 901, 903 (2010) ("Iqbal makes it easier for courts to dismiss lawsuits at the outset,
once again making it harder for plaintiffs to get past a defendant's motion to dismiss.").
41. Niles, supra note 35, at 1339 ("The only 'incentive' that potential liability for
negligent acts would place on government officials performing activities analogous to private
conduct would be the incentive to act in a reasonable manner, particularly when the
contemplated act poses the threat of causing harm.").
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in the latter part of the 20th Century.4 2 This more modem defense has removed
the common law's focus on the "subjective" mental state of the government actor
in question and instead addresses the objective reasonableness of the action
itself.43
In light of the modem version of qualified immunity protection 44 and the
new procedural sufficiency standard set out in lqbal, the social harms that
currently result from prosecutorial misconduct can be diminished by replacing
absolute immunity protection with qualified immunity without posing a
legitimate threat of increased diversion of prosecutorial focus. 45
1. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE FAILURE OF NON-LIABILITY
REMEDIES

Criminal prosecutors play a unique and vital role in our criminal justice
system and wield an incomparable amount of power over individuals and the
broader communities that they serve. 46 While the majority of prosecutors
perform their duties in good faith, 47 there is a wide array of statistical analyses
42. See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
JudicialActivism and the Restriction of ConstitutionalRights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 35-47
(1989) (discussing the development of the qualified immunity defense in courts throughout

the United States).
43. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1981) ("[W]e conclude today that
bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs
of trial or to the burdens or broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.") (citation omitted)).
44. See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 250-51 (discussing the evolution of qualified
immunity as a defense with both objective and subjective components to one where the
defendant's subjective motivation is irrelevant).
45. For arguments in favor of replacing absolute immunity with qualified immunity as
the applicable defense for prosecutors in claims seeking civil damages see generally Johns,
supra note 12, at 106-45; Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 220-31.
46. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revising the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the
MisbehavingProsecutor:Deterrence Economicsand TransitoryProsecutors,61 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURv. AM. L. 45, 45 (2005) ("The prosecutor's power to employ the full machinery of the state
to scrutinize and force an individual's immersion in a criminal investigation and adjudication
occupies a unique position among state actors whose authority suggests the potential for
deprivation of precious rights.").
47. Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Forewordto KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N.
CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

IN
CALIFORNIA
1997-2009,
at
v
(2010),
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context-ncippubs
("The majority of California prosecutors successfully discharge the obligations requisite in
their two roles: acting both as advocates in seeking convictions and as ministers of justice,
charged with using only fair methods to prosecute those they believe are guilty."); see also
Caldwell, supra note 33, at 54 ("To be clear, instances of prosecutorial misconduct are
relatively rare.").
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that catalogue the growing problem of prosecutorial misconduct in this country. 48
But these disturbing numbers likely expose only a small percentage of the actual
instances of misconduct in part because the vast majority of criminal cases are
resolved by plea bargain. 49 Legal scholars have discussed this problem across the
full spectrum of criminal practice (including charging, plea bargaining and
trial),50 and the lack of any viable mechanism to discourage or punish any of
these forms of misconduct. This Article will focus on instances of intentional
prosecutorial misconduct in preparation for and during trial, and the lack of any
measurable consequences for those actions.
As detailed below, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the scope of civil
liability for prosecutors who engage in misconduct has cloaked prosecutors with
absolute immunity from any claim based on their official advocacy-related
activities." In the course of justifying the application of absolute prosecutorial
immunity, courts have frequently referenced mechanisms other than tort liability
that arguably serve to incentivize appropriate conduct on the part of prosecutors.
In one characteristic example, the Supreme Court observed:
We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability .. . does not leave
the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs. This
Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil
immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach
of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for
centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional
rights . . . . The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful acts. Moreover,

48. See Dunahoe, supra note 46 ("Prosecutorial misconduct documented by the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility has tripled during the last
decade, requiring a larger staff of investigative lawyers to police abuses by Justice Department
attorneys.").
49. See David Keenan et al., The Myth ofProsecutorialAccountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
ProsecutorialMisconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 209-10 (2011) (detailing several
"empirical problems [that] hamper efforts to provide an accurate assessment of prosecutorial
misconduct in the United States" including: 1) that "prosecutors who engage in willful
misconduct presumably do not want to be discovered and therefore take steps to conceal their
misdeeds," 2) that "prosecutors' offices enjoy considerable autonomy in shaping their internal
policies . . . [and] courts are generally loath to interfere with [their inner workings]," 3) that
"the vast majority of known instances of prosecutorial misconduct come to light only during
the course of a . .. trial. . . . But most criminal cases in the United States result in plea
bargains," and 4) that "those in the best position to report misconduct-namely judges, other
prosecutors and defense attorneys and their clients-are often disincentivized from doing so
for both strategic and political reasons.").
50. Peter J. Henning, ProsecutorialMisconduct and ConstitutionalRemedies, 77 WASH.
U.L.Q. 714, 714-16 (1999); George A. Weiss, ProsecutorialAccountabilityAfter Connick v.

Thompson, 60 DRAKE L. REv. 201, 201-02 (2011).
51. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (stating that a prosecutor's
administrative and investigatory functions unrelated to the preparation for prosecution or
judicial proceedings are not protected by absolute immunity); see also Bums v. Reed, 500

U.S. 478, 496 (1991).
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a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive
persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by
an association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the
imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful
of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime. 52

Here 53 the Court identifies two main alternative means of dissuading and
punishing intentional prosecutorial misconduct-criminal prosecution and
professional sanction.54 Before discussing the justifications for an expansion of
the scope of civil liability for prosecutors, it is reasonable to ask whether the
Court is correct that these devices provide an effective means for the public to
"deter misconduct or punish that which occurs." 55
In her recent book, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American
56
Prosecutor,
Professor Angela J. Davis identifies several categories of
prosecutorial misconduct. These demonstrated instances are all the more
daunting in light of the reality that there is "no opportunity to challenge any
misconduct that may have occurred in the over 95% of all criminal cases which
result in a guilty plea." 5 Davis notes that for this and other reasons, "much
prosecutorial misconduct goes unchallenged, suggesting that the problem is
much more widespread than the many reported cases" indicate.58
Professor Davis provides some perspective on the question of whether the

52. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-39 (1976) (citations omitted).
53. See, e.g., Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) ("The Court also noted that there
are other checks on prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law and professional

discipline.").
54. One potential mechanism for controlling or deterring prosecutorial misconduct not
referenced here by the Court is the political process-the potential for publicly disclosed
misdeeds of prosecutors resulting in their removal from office by the electorate. A recent high
profile example of the removal of a controversial prosecutor occurred with the Democratic
primary loss of Chicago prosecutor Anita Alvarez in March 2016 in the wake of the release of
a video of police shooting Laquan McDonald. Mark Guarino, Chicago ProsecutorLoses
Reelection Battle in the Shadow ofthe Laquan McDonald Video, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/03/15/chicagos-prosecutorfaces-a-reelection-battle-in-the-shadow-of-the-laquan-mcdonaldvideo/?utm term=.0dl43b53294a.
55. See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposalfor Policing
Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA

CLARA L. REV. 303, 304 (2010) (discussing mechanisms other than civil or criminal liability
or professional sanction for prosecutors to discourage specific misconduct including the failure
to turn over Brady material to the defendant, including "dismissal of the indictment ...
without the possibility of re-indictment, rather than a new trial, where the Brady violation is
show to be the product of willful misconduct by the prosecutor.").
56. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007).

57. Id. at 127.
58. Id. at 126 ("Most of the prosecutorial practices that occur behind closed doors, such
as charging and plea bargaining decisions and grand jury practices, are never revealed to the

public.").

20 17]

A NEW BALANCE OF EVILS

149

non-civil liability mechanisms of criminal and professional sanction are effective
in deterring or punishing prosecutorial misconduct. 59 She cites a study which
showed that from 1963 to 1999 the homicide convictions of at least 381
defendants were dismissed because their prosecutors had "either concealed
exculpatory information or presented false evidence." 60 Of these defendants,
sixty-seven had been sentenced to death.6' The study noted that given the limited
focus on murder convictions, these instances of Brady62 violations were almost
certainly just a fraction of the total committed by prosecutors across the spectrum
of criminal prosecution, and that none of "the prosecutors who engaged in the
reported misconduct" was convicted of a crime or prevented from practicing
law.63 Indeed, the same study provided compelling evidence that some
prosecutors found their careers advanced as a result of (or at least in spite of)
their violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. 64
Among the many identifiable categories of prosecutorial misconduct,
Professor Davis focuses her attention on what she calls "the most common form
of misconduct": Brady violations. 65 Professor Cynthia Jones also has addressed
this specific category, noting that notwithstanding the frequency of these

59. Professor Caldwell provides an overview of studies nationwide regarding
prosecutorial conduct. See Caldwell, supra note 33, at 68-81 (noting surveys of several
procedures applied by the bars of the several states and the U.S. Department of Justice to
address prosecutorial misconduct).
60. DAVIS, supra note 56, at 131.

6 1. Id.
62. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution").
63. DAVIS, supra note 56, at 131; see also id. at 135-36 ("In the 381 cases [Chicago
Tribunejournalists Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley] examined in which appellate courts
reversed convictions based on either Brady violations or prosecutors knowingly allowing lying
witnesses to testify, the courts described the behavior in terms such as 'unforgiveable,'

'intolerable,' 'beyond reprehension,' and 'illegal, improper and dishonest.' Yet of those cases,
[o]ne was fired, but appealed and was reinstated with back pay. Another received an in-house
suspension of 30 days. And a third prosecutor's law license was suspended for 59 days, but
because of other misconduct in the case . .. not one received any kind of public sanction from
a state lawyer disciplinary agency or was convinced of any crime for hiding evidence or
presenting false evidence ..... (footnote omitted) (citing Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley,
Verdict: Dishonor, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at Cl)).
64. Id. at 136 ("It is unclear whether any were sanctioned by state bar authorities,
because these proceedings are not a matter of public record if the sanction was minor. Several
of the offending prosecutors advanced significantly in their careers. . ." (footnote and internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Verdict: Dishonor, CHIC.

TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at Cl)).
65. Id. at 126; see also Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 228 ("At a minimum, Brady casts
prosecutors in what Justice Marshall called an 'unharmonious role.' Of course, they are
officers of the court, but they are also hard-charging, competitive lawyers whose reputations
and satisfactions depend on obtaining convictions.").
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violations, "in the overwhelming majority of cases, prosecutors face few, if any,
adverse consequences for Brady violations either within their offices or from an
outside entity with the power to address their misconduct."6 6 This is true even in
instances of intentional and blatant prosecutorial misconduct 67 because "when
Brady violations are discovered-even when the violations are intentional and
blatant-trial judges focus on curing any harm suffered by the defendant but fail
to take punitive measures against the offending prosecutor to deter future Brady
violations." 68 There is evidence that these violations have a measurable impact
on our criminal justice system. Jones notes that Brady violations "played a major
role in the wrongful conviction of more than one-third of the prisoners later
exonerated by DNA evidence[]" 69 and those exonerated on other grounds,
including several defendants who were sentenced to death. 70
In addition, there is no evidence that the threat of criminal prosecution for
their misdeeds has any practical impact on prosecutors. Professor Davis notes
that much of what constitutes "prosecutorial misconduct" involves criminal
conduct. She observes, "[w]hen prosecutors knowingly put witnesses on the
stand to testify falsely, they suborn perjury. Subornation of perjury is a felony in
all fifty states.... Yet, despite overwhelming evidence that prosecutors routinely
break the law, they are not punished." 7 1
There are essentially no criminal indictments of prosecutors in our legal
system. Professor Davis notes that only six prosecutors in the United States were
subject to criminal prosecution for subornation of perjury in all of the 20th
century, 72 including five prosecutors in one particularly egregious case

66. Cynthia Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference
ofInnocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 419 (2010).
67. Id. at 421 ("Even though the disclosure duty is violated regardless of whether the
nondisclosure in negligent or intentional, the most egregious Brady violations occur when
prosecutors purposely withhold information that they know is clearly and unquestionably
favorable to the defense.").
68. Id. at 420; see also id at 428 ("Intentional violations occur when the prosecutor fully
understands the Brady disclosure duty, is aware of the existence of favorable evidence in the
government's possession, appreciates the exculpatory or impeachment value of the evidence,
but intentionally withholds the evidence to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation.").
69. Id. at 429 (citation omitted); see also Hessick, supra note 36, at 259 ("Even in this
age of scientific evidence, prosecutor misconduct poses a real danger of convicting an innocent
defendant. A 1992 study by Northwestern University sampled 400 people wrongfully
convicted of death penalty offenses in the last 50 years. Of those cases, 15% to 20% involved
unethical and illegal conduct by prosecutors, including subornation of perjury and mishandling
of evidence. Wrongfully exposing innocent people to a loss of liberty deserves punishment.").
70. Jones, supranote 66, at 429-30 ("In one case, after twelve years on death row, a man
came within fifteen hours of execution before being granted habeas relief. More recently,
Delma Banks was strapped to a gurney in the Texas death chamber and was within ten minutes
of execution when the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and ruled that he was entitled
to habeas relief based on Brady violations that infected his trial.").
71. DAVIS, supra note 56, at 136 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 137 ("According to Armstrong and Posley only six prosecutors have been
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commonly referred to as the "Du Page Five." 73 Had the five prosecutors indicted
in this case been convicted, "it would have been the first time that prosecutors
had been found guilty of felonious prosecutorial misconduct. Prior to the Du
Page prosecution, it appears that there was only one criminal action against a
prosecutor who violated a defendant's civil rights (the conviction resulted in
74
$500 fine and a suspension that was reduced by the judge to a censure)."
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the lack of criminal indictment of
prosecutors is the inherent conflict of interest that arises when the "people
charged with investigating and indicting a state prosecutor . .. may be current or
former coworkers of the accused." 75
In its 2003 report on prosecutorial misconduct, the Center for Public
Integrity found that "prosecutors faced disciplinary proceedings for misconduct
76
that infringed on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants" in only fortyfour cases since 1970. Professor Davis provides at least one explanation for the
paucity of state bar enforcement actions against prosecutors, noting that "[s]ince
over 95% of criminal cases result in guilty pleas, every defense attorney knows
that her future clients are at the mercy of the prosecutor ... Challenging the bar
indicted in this century for the type of misconduct alleged in the Cruz prosecutors." (citation
omitted)); see also David A. Love, Finally, A Prosecutor Goes to Jail for Evidence
PM),
3:46
2013,
18,
(Nov.
POST
HUFFINGTON
Tampering,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-a-love/finally-a-prosecutor-goes-tojail_b_4268214.html (reporting that Ken Anderson, the former Williamson County, Texas
District Attorney and 1995 prosecutor of the year in Texas, was sentenced to 10 days in jail
for criminal contempt. "Anderson violated a court order when the judge asked him whether he
had any evidence that was favorable [to the defendant] and Anderson said no. In fact,
Anderson was aware of statements made by several key witnesses, but chose not to disclose
them.").
73. Hessick, supra note 36, at 269.
74. Id. at 269 ("In the case United States v. Brophy, a prosecutor was convicted of
suborning perjury, fabricating evidence, withholding evidence, and knowingly introducing
false, misleading and perjured testimony at a state proceeding. After conviction, the prosecutor
was sentenced to pay a $500 fine. The conviction also resulted in an automatic suspension, but
the court reduced the suspension to censure, finding that Brophy already 'had suffered the
stigma of a criminal conviction."' (citation omitted)).
75. Id.; see also Alisha L. McKay, Let the Master Answer: Why the Doctrine of
Respondeat Superior Should Be Used to Address Egregious Prosecutorial Misconduct
Resulting in Wrongful Convictions, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 1215, 1230 ("Criminal sanctions,
though theoretically available to discourage prosecutorial misconduct, are seldom used to
address the problem."); Weiss, supra note 50, at 220-21 ("Perhaps the most drastic deterrent
to prosecutorial misconduct is criminal sanctions for those who abuse the rights of the criminal
defendant. Federal law, codified at 18 U.S.C § 242, criminalizes 'willful' actions under color
of law that violate constitutional rights... . Additionally, prosecutors can be held in criminal
contempt if they violate rules of the court. Recently, this sanction was used against Michael
Nifong, the prosecutor who indicted several Duke University lacrosse players. As one scholar
pointed out, while this form of criminal sanction is slightly more common, it is less serious
than sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and perhaps even less serious than professional discipline
or civil damages." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. DAVIS, supra note 56, at 128-29 (citations omitted).
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license of an official who holds all the cards is risky business, especially given
the odds of prevailing." 77
Scholars and attorneys have provided additional evidence of the lack of
meaningful sanctions, either criminal78 or professional, 79 for prosecutorial
misconduct.80 In a 2010 report for the Veritas Initiative and the Northern
California Innocence Project, Kathleen Ridolfi and Maurice Possley analyzed
the response by the California state bar to instances of prosecutorial misconduct
in the early 21st century.8 i The study, which reviewed more than 4,000 state and
federal appellate rulings, noted that the "majority of California prosecutors
successfully discharge the obligations required for the two roles" of seeking
conviction and promoting justice.82 In about 3,000 of the cases reviewed, courts
rejected allegations of misconduct and in almost 300 failed to decide the issue
one way or the other, finding that the trials were fair whether or not the actions
of the prosecutor amounted to misconduct.8 3 In the remaining 707 cases,
prosecutorial misconduct was found by the reviewing court. 84 While this
amounted to approximately one case of misconduct per week, the report noted
that the number "undoubtedly understates the total number of such cases [as they
are] just the cases identified in review of appellate cases and a handful of others
found through media searches and other means."" This limited window only
exposes cases that were litigated at trial-less than 3% of the total felony
criminal cases resolved in the state-and those cases where the misconduct
became apparent to opposing counsel and where counsel had the means to file

77. Id. at 130.
78. See Aditi Sherikar, ProsecutingProsecutors:A Needfor Uniform Sanctions, 25 GEO.

J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1013-14 ("Outside of civil liability, criminal liability can be imposed
on prosecutors under federal law. But, like with municipal liability, criminal liability does not
provide much solace. To be liable for criminal sanctions, the prosecutor must willfully engage
in misconduct, rendering the government's burden of pursuing criminal punishment for
unethical prosecutors daunting and making criminal sanctions available only for a fraction of
instances of misconduct." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. See McKay, supra note 75, at 1228 (discussing "several explanations underlying bar
associations' reluctance to sanction prosecutors who engage misconduct.")
80. See Sherikar, supra note 78, at 1011-12 ("The American Bar Association (ABA)
lends little guidance to disciplinary boards charged with sanctioning misconduct. The standard
used is to look to comparable misconduct and sanction based on how other cases have been
decided. There are multiple problems with this approach. First, there are comparatively few
prosecutorial misconduct cases in general (compared to cases of other types of attorney
misconduct). Second, a comparison of prosecutorial misconduct with other types of attorney
misconduct is inappropriate because prosecutors enjoy a remarkably unique position within
the justice system, and thus there should be a separate set of sanctions that account for the
special role of prosecutors in our system.").
81. Ridolfi & Possley, supra note 47, at 2.
82. Id. at v.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2-3.
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an appeal. 16
In 548 of the 707 instances of misconduct that were identified, the reviewing
court nonetheless upheld the convictions, ruling that notwithstanding the
misconduct, the defendants had received fair trials. 7 In just 20% of the cases,
prosecutors' actions resulted in the setting aside of a conviction or the barring of
otherwise admissible evidence. 88
The report found that there was no measurable threat of disciplinary action
from the Bar for prosecutorial misconduct in California. Of the 4,741 public
disciplinary actions reported in the California State Bar Journal from 1997 to
September 2007, only six (or .001%) involved allegations of misconduct by a
prosecutor in a criminal case. 89 Comparing this data to the incidents of
misconduct that were identified by the appellate courts, the study found that "the
State Bar publically disciplined only 1% of the prosecutors in the 600 cases in
which the courts found prosecutorial misconduct, 90 even in instances involving
multiple violations by the same prosecutor. 91 The six prosecutors who were
sanctioned by the California Bar had all withheld evidence. 92 All were sanctioned
after the establishment of the California Commissions on Fair Administration of
Justice in 2004. Prior to that date, no prosecutors were disciplined by the Bar for
misconduct and no prosecutor has ever been disbarred as a result of misconduct
in the state.93
The data regarding the lack of any measurable consequences for prosecutors
who negligently or intentionally violate the rights of the accused led the Veritas
report to conclude that the Supreme Court's repeated "assumption that
prosecutorial misconduct would be deterred and punished by the disciplinary
bodies charged with the responsibility of regulating conduct" is completely

86. Id. at 3.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 23 (noting that the standard for determining "harmless error" focuses on the
question of whether the accused received a fair trial notwithstanding the disputed prosecutorial
conduct, and as such "the prosecutorial misconduct in the 548 harmless error cases may have
involved infractions just as serious as - in some cases, identical to - those in the 159 harmful
error cases. Yet in the harmless error cases, the courts have no obligation to report misconduct
to the State Bar or notify the prosecutor of the misconduct finding.").
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 16 ("67 of the 600 identified prosecutors in the 707 cases where misconduct
was found committed misconduct more than once, three committed misconduct four times and
two did so five times.").
92. Id. at 55.
93. Id. at 57 ("A striking example of repeat prosecutorial misconduct that has not been
publicly disciplined is Los Angeles County deputy district attorney Grace Rai. In October
2008, the Court of Appeal reversed the conviction of Mark Broughton and severely criticized
Rai's conduct in prosecuting the case. The court found that Rai committed serial misconduct
that included asking improper questions, eliciting inadmissible evidence and hearsay,
disobeying court orders and making improper arguments.").
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refuted by the realities of our criminal process. 94 Among its many
recommendations, the report argues that prosecutors "should be entitled at best

to qualified immunity." 95
The information detailed above clearly demonstrates that the Supreme
Court's assumed alternatives to civil liability for incentivizing prosecutors to
avoid misconduct-criminal culpability and/or professional sanction-have
little if any impact on the actual practice of law in this country. Civil liability of
prosecutors, particularly for their intentional or reckless misconduct, would
appear to be a vital, if not the exclusive, mechanism for discouraging that
misconduct and encouraging the proper and just performance of prosecutorial
duties. 96
However, the application of absolute immunity to prosecutors for their
advocacy-related activities leaves civil liability just as impotent a mechanism for
influencing prosecutorial conduct as professional ethics and criminal law
regimes. In the remainder of this paper, I will describe the development, nature
and scope of absolute immunity and the justifications that have been offered for
its application. I argue that absolute immunity should no longer be available to
prosecutors and that it should be replaced with the defense of qualified
immunity-particularly in light of recent changes in sufficiency standards for
complaints in federal court.
II. ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY

A. Development: Malicious Prosecution at Common Law
Prosecutors have enjoyed the defense of absolute immunity for civil claims
arising out their official functions, which developed from the common law
response to malicious prosecution. 97 But this version of its development has been

94. Id. at 75.
95. Id. at 81; see also id. at 75 ("The stringent requirements to surmount a qualified
immunity defense provide ethical prosecutors adequate protection to ensure independent
performance of their duties: the victim of misconduct would need to prove that the prosecutor
violated clearly-established constitutional law with a culpable state of mind.").
96. But see Paul Figley, In Defense ofFeres: An Unfairly MalignedOpinion, 60 AM. U.
L. REv. 393, 462-63 (2011) ("[A]s a general matter there is reason to believe that governments
are not responsive to financial deterrence in the same way as private entities. . . . Because
governments and agencies respond to political interests rather than financial ones, it is unlikely
that requiring them to pay tort judgments will cause them to alter their practices or begin new
loss prevention initiatives." (citing Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and
the Retention ofSovereign Immunity in the MilitarySystem ofGovernance, 71 GEO. WASH. L.

REv. 1, 48 (2003))).
97. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) ("The decision in Tenney established
that § 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses
rather than in derogation of them.").
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convincingly challenged.98 A brief survey of the defense begins with a summary
of the malicious prosecution claim and moves through the development of civil
liability (or lack thereof) for judges, legislators and prosecuting attorneys in the
1 9 th century. It finally touches on the application of these standards (and
associated defenses) to causes of action for claims alleging violations for
constitutional and other federal rights by government officials provided for by
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and now codified at 28 USC 1983 and
Bivens claims (similar to 1983 claims but against federal officials) alleging
violations of statutory and constitutional rights by prosecuting attomeys. 99
The common law tort of malicious prosecution was established when a
plaintiff showed that a prior civil or criminal proceeding, instituted maliciously
and without probable cause, was terninated in her favor."oo The cause of action
"had its roots in a concern for the integrity of the court."o' The tort provided
plaintiffs with a remedy against a private party for "unjustified harm arising out
of the misuse of government processes." 02
While the malicious prosecution action was available against public officials
and private citizens, 103 it was generally disfavored at common law for at least
one of the reasons used today to justify the absolute immunity defense-the
perceived impact of exposure to liability on the ability and willingness of the
prosecutor to properly perform his duties.1 04 Griffith v. Slinkard is generally
considered the first case where a United States court addressed the issue of
prosecutorial civil liability. 05 The Supreme Court of Indiana heard the appeal of
a malicious prosecution claim alleging that, in the course of his presentation of
evidence, the prosecutor "maliciously, wrongfully and willfully intending to
98. See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 220 ("However ready one may be to assume that

the Civil Rights Act of 1871 silently incorporated common-law immunities, absolute
prosecutorial immunity cannot rest on that basis.").
99. See generally Esther M. Schonfeld, Note, Malicious Prosecutionas a Constitutional
Tort: Continued Confusion and Uncertainty, 15 ToURo L. REv. 1681, 1702-04 (1999)
(summarizing the development of the tort of malicious prosecution until Saville v. Roberts in
1689). For more on section 1983 claims, see infra note 123 and accompanying text. For more
on Bivens claims, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
100.

STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS,

§ 3:11

(Clark

Boardman Callaghan 1987).
101. Schonfeld, supra note 99, at 1702.
102. Id.
103. Lyle Kossis, Note, Malicious ProsecutionClaims in Section 1983 Lawsuits, 99 VA.

L. REv. 1635, 1637-39 (2013).
104. Watts v. Gerking, 228 P. 135, 137 (Or. 1924) ("Public policy favors prosecutions

&

for crime, and requires that a person who in good faith and upon reasonable grounds institutes
such proceedings upon a criminal charge be protected." (citing 19 AMERICAN & ENGLISH
ENCYC. OF LAW (2nd ed. 1901) 650 and 18 RULING CASE LAW 11 (William McKinney

Burdett Rich eds., 1917))).
105. See Margaret Z. Johns, ReconsideringAbsoluteProsecutorialImmunity, 2005 BYU

L. REv. 53, 114-15 (2005).
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injure [the] plaintiff, represented to said grand jury that he was able to present
evidence that would . .. justify an indictment against said plaintiff." 06
The court noted that even if they had acted with malice toward the plaintiff,
the members of the grand jury could not be held "liable to the injured person in
an action for malicious prosecution."' 07 Previously, in Hunter v. Mathis, the
Indiana Supreme Court had cited "Hawkins Pleas of the Crown" for the
proposition that grand jurors must be immune from civil liability in order to
ensure the proper function of the criminal justice system, because "[flew persons
would be willing to act as grand jurors, if, upon testimony of their
fellows ... they would be liable to be subjected to an action and to the payment
of damages" and to concede that "grand jurors are sometimes influenced by
improper motives," but that, nonetheless, "the evils which would result from any
other rule would be far more frequent and pernicious than those resulting from
this." 0 8
After discussing the immunity of the grand jurors against civil claims for
malicious prosecution, the Slinkard court asked whether "the prosecuting
attorney [is] any more liable for his alleged participation in procuring the
indictment maliciously and without probable cause?" 0 9 The court concluded that
a prosecutor is an officer "intrusted (sic.) with the administration of justice" and
is, therefore, "ajudicial officer" and is protected by the kind of immunity against
civil liability that traditionally applied to judges, and for the same reasons." 0
In the decades after Slinkard, several state courts held that prosecutors were
cloaked with absolute immunity against civil liability.'' But there were
exceptions to this treatment during the period, particularly in cases involving
intentional or willful misconduct." 2 The Supreme Court of the Territory of
Hawaii, for example, ruled in 1916 that while a prosecutor acting in good faith
would have a defense against a claim of wrongful prosecution, he could be found

106. Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1001 (Ind. 1896).
107. Id. at 1002.

108. Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356, 358 (1872).
109. Slinkard, 44 N.E. at 1002.
110. Id. (citing JoHN TOWNSHEND, THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL § 227 (3d

ed. 1877)).
111. See Smith v. Parman, 165 P. 663, 663-64 (Kan. 1917) (extending absolute immunity
from judges and grandjurors to public prosecutors); Semmes v. Collins, 82 So. 145, 146 (Miss.

1919) (citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 499 (1896)); Kittler v. Kelsch, 216 N.W. 898,
904 (N.D. 1927) (adopting absolute immunity for prosecutors); Watts v. Gerking, 228 P. 135,
144 (Or. 1924) (holding the prosecutor liable in the case at bar but affirming immunity for
prosecutors acting in their quasi-judicial functions).

112. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275-78 (1993) (holding that a prosecutor's
fabrication of false evidence during a preliminary investigation of an unsolved crime and a
prosecutor's false assertions to the media are not protected under absolute immunity); see also
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985) (concluding that the Attorney General is not
absolutely immune from litigation involving damages resulting from unconstitutional conduct
in performing his national security functions).
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civilly liable for injuries resulting from malicious acts." 3 In Leong Yau v.
Carden, the plaintiff alleged that a deputy Honolulu prosecutor falsely and
maliciously brought criminal proceedings against him, influenced the sheriff to
issue an exorbitant bail amount, and delayed trial for several weeks until the
indictment was dismissed and the plaintiff was released.1 4 In its response to the
defendant's assertion of immunity, the court noted that prosecutors are "like all
enrolled attorneys ... officers of the courts, they are not part of the courts" and
are consequently "quasi-judicial" as opposed to purely judicial officers." 5
This conclusion, however, did not lead the court to reject the application of
liability limitation to the quasi-judicial prosecutor."' 6 The court held that "[t]here
is nothing in that statement inconsistent with the view that public prosecutors
may render themselves liable by acting with malice and without probable cause"
and that prosecutors "are entitled to protection against claims growing out of the
discharge of their duties done in goodfaith though with erroneousjudgment,but
private individuals are entitled to the protection of the law against any conduct
of such officers which is at once reckless, malicious and damaging."'17
The United States Supreme Court first ruled on the question of the scope of
prosecutorial liability for malicious prosecution in a per curiam affirmancells of
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Yaselli v. Goff'I' The plaintiff had alleged that Special Assistant United States
Attorney Goff sought indictment against him "falsely, maliciously and without
any reasonable or probable cause."' 20 In affirming the rejection of plaintiffs
claim by the district court, the court of appeals stated it was a fundamental
principle of English and American law that it is "not in the public interests that
such a suit should be maintained[.]"l 2 1
B. Constitutional Torts and Absolute Immunity
Beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, civil claims alleging
injury resulting from the wrongful conduct of a prosecutor were readily available

113. See Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362, 368 (1916) (holding that prosecutors enjoy
qualified immunity in cases where they are alleged to have acted with malice and without color
ofauthority).
114. Id. at363.

115. Id. at 367.
116. Id. at 368 (noting that the "same reasons of private interest and public policy which

operate to render the judicial officer exempt from civil liability for his judicial acts within his
jurisdiction apply equally as well to the quasi-judicial officer").
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 357 (1871).
119. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 407 (2d Cir. 1926).
120. Id. at 397.
121. Id. at 399.
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under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.122 Prosecutorial liability jurisprudence under
Section 1983123 expressly adopted the concepts of limited prosecutorial
immunity expressed by courts as part of their interpretation of common law
principles. 124 Compelling arguments have been made that the incorporation of
common law limitations on liability for claims arising out of Section 1983 is not
justified given the nature and intent of the statute. 125 The discussion here,
however, accepts this application (or at least, acknowledges that it is likely to
continue), and seeks to determine the appropriate scope of two controversial
descendants of the common law approach-absolute and qualified immunity.
In Bradley v. Fisherl26 the Supreme Court provided the foundation for its
subsequent application of absolute prosecutorial immunity in the Section 1983
context in a case involving a lawsuit against a judge.1 27 An attorney filed an
action against a sitting judge alleging damages arising from "willful, malicious,
oppressive, and tyrannical acts and conduct."l 28 The attorney, who had
represented John Suratt, one of the men charged in the conspiracy to kill

122. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961) ("There can be no doubt ...

that

Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who
carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it. The question with which we now deal is the
narrower one of whether Congress, in enacting [section 1983], meant to give a remedy to
parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of
his position. We conclude that it did so intend." (citation omitted)).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed for redress.").
124. Nicholas R. Battey, A Chink in the Armor? The ProsecutorialImmunity Split in the
Seventh Circuit in Light of Whitlock, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 553, 563 (2014) ("Immunity from
civil liability for certain governmental officials traces back to English and colonial common
law. While Section 1983 does not mention immunity in the statute, nor does the legislative
history of the original act, the Supreme Court applied common law immunity to Section 1983
claims, finding that Congress did not expressly attempt to destroy common law immunities
through the creation of a federal civil remedy.").
125. See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 221 ("[A] hypothetical legislator in 1871
conscientiously researching the common law on the eve of the passage of § 1983 would have
found the well-established tort of malicious prosecution, which had been upheld in an action
against a public prosecutor for eliciting and using false testimony. Additionally, he would have
found no immunity defense to insulate the prosecutor from liability if the elements of the cause
of action were proven, for there was not a single decision affording prosecutors any kind of
immunity defense from liability for malicious prosecution.") (footnote omitted).

126. See generally Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871).
127. Id. at 351 ("[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to
civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess oftheir jurisdiction ...");
see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) ("We conclude that the Court of
Appeals, employing an unduly restrictive view of the scope of Judge Stump's jurisdiction,
erred in holding that he was not entitled to judicial immunity.").
128. Fisher, 80 U.S. at 336.
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President Lincoln, and the judge in the trial apparently had some kind of angry
altercation immediately after the case was over. 129 The judge characterized the
dispute as a "threat[]" of "personal chastisement" by the attorney, while the
attorney claimed "there was no altercation . . . between him and the judge, and
that no words passed between them." 30 The judge ordered that the attorney be
disbarred from practicing in the jurisdiction and the attorney brought an action
against the judge.131 The trial court rejected the attorney's claim, holding that
"the defendant had jurisdiction and discretion to make the order, and he could
not be held responsible in this private action for so doing. ... "132
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the attorney's license to practice
33
had been subsequently reinstated in response to a separate mandamus action'
and affirmed the district court, holding that judges "are not liable to civil action
for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and
are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." 34
The Supreme Court applied the defense of absolute immunity in the context
35
of a constitutional tort claim for the first time in 1951. In Tenney v. Brandhove,
the plaintiff brought an action against members of the State of California's
version of the House Un-American Activities Committee (commonly known at
the time as the Tenney Committee) and other officials, seeking $10,000 and
alleging that a hearing he was obliged to attend "'was not held for a legislative
purpose' but was designed 'to intimidate and silence' him and violated his
constitutional rights.1 36 The district court dismissed the complaint without
opinion but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint stated a cause
of action against the Committee and its members.' 37 The court expressed no
opinion about the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, holding that "the alleged
circumstances of this case are too ambiguous and complex to warrant judgment
on the complaint alone" and that the motion to dismiss for "insufficiency should
38
have been denied and the defendants required to answer."
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the
majority, held that the federal civil rights legislation "on which this action is
founded does not impose liability on the facts before us, once they are related to

129. Id. at 337.
130. Id. at 339-40.
131. Id. at 337.
132. Id. at 340.
133. Id at 341.
134. Id. at 351.
135. 341 U.S. at 367.
136. Id. at 369, 371.
137. Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d 121, 124 (9th Cir. 1950) ("[I]t is rationally possible
to believe that the Committee purposely undertook, under an appearance of regularity, to
intimidate, punish and oppress him for having done what he did.").
138. Id.

160

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [XIII:137

the presuppositions of our political history."'3 9 He went on to cite the 1689 Bill
of Rights in England, the forerunner of the U.S. Constitution's Speech or Debate
Clause of Article I, Section 6,140 arguing that "[fjreedom of speech and action in
the legislature was taken as a matter of course" by the founding fathers and that
the reasons for such protection were "clear" and substantially the same as those
that courts have used to justify the application of absolute prosecutorial

immunity. 141
Justice Frankfurter posed the question of whether Congress had intended to
alter or abridge this traditional immunity defense when it passed federal civil

rights legislation in 1871. He concluded that the answer was no. 142 Then, in
language reminiscent of his friend and mentor' 43 Learned Hand's opinion in
Gregoirejust three years before, he applied absolute immunity protection for the

challenged actions:
The claim of unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators
are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not
expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of very
little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial .. . or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon
ajury's speculation as to motives. 144
Justice William Douglas dissented, noting that he agreed with the general
statements of the majority opinion regarding legislative liability, but did "not
agree that all abuses of legislative committees are solely for the legislative body
to police."1 45 He wrote that he could "think of no reason why [a legislative
committee that deprives citizens of constitutional rights] should be immune [to
civil liability]. . . . [W]e are apparently holding today that the actions of those
committees have no limits in the eyes of the law. May they depart with impunity
139. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372.
140. Id. at 372-73.
141. Id. at 372-73 ("In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected for the resentment
of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offen[d].")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, VOL. 1138 (James
DeWitt Andrews ed. 1896).
142. Id. at 376 ("We cannot believe that Congress-itself a staunch advocate of
legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by
covert inclusion in the general language before us.").
143. Gunther, supra note 15, at 187 ("Frankfurter was ten years younger than Hand,
much younger than the other reformist lawyers in his circle, but this difference in age was no
obstacle to a fast-developing friendship that deepened for the rest of Hand's life .... .").
144. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78 (concluding that "[i]n times of political passion,
dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily
believed. Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must
be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.").
145. Id. at 381-82.
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from their legislative functions, sit as kangaroo courts, and try men for their
loyalty and their political beliefs?" 4 6 Justice Douglas concluded by asserting: "It
was indeed the purpose of this civil rights legislation to secure federal rights
against invasion by officers and agents of the states. I see no reason why any
officer of government should be higher than the Constitution from which all
rights and privileges of an office obtain." 47
C. Section 1983 and Prosecutorial Immunity
1. Appellate Cases
Beginning in the early 1960s after the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe
v. Pape,' 48 several Section 1983 cases involving the application of the absolute
immunity defense to prosecutors reached federal appellate courts. In several of
these cases, the courts considered the defense to be a product of the prosecutor's
"judicial" or "quasi-judicial" role in the justice system and, in all but two, upheld
the application of the absolute immunity defense.1 49 In the majority of cases, the
courts did not so much compare the work of prosecutors to that of judges
(demonstrably different kinds of tasks carried out by officials in different
branches of government) as they noted the necessity that both kinds of officials
be free to fulfill their duties absent distractions caused by exposure to civil
liability. 15
In Hilliardv. Williams 15 ' and Guerro v. Mulhearn,152 federal appellate courts
rejected the application of absolute prosecutorial immunity. In Hilliard,a former
criminal defendant alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence and knowing
presentation of false testimony by the prosecutor in procuring a conviction later
overturned on appeal. 5 3 The court held that while it was "well settled that a
146. Id. at 382.
147. Id. at 383.

148. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see also Rudovsky, supra note 42, at 27-28 ("In Monroe v.
Pape, the Court decided a fundamental issue of statutory construction regarding the scope of
§ 1983. The Court ruled that the phrase 'under color of state law' was intended to include
actions undertaken by government officials without state approval or authorization which were
indeed contrary to established law, custom, and practice.... In determining that § 1983 was
intended to remedy such violations, the Court freed the Act from a narrow and unjustified
construction.").

149. See Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1975); Weathers v. Ebert,
505 F.2d 514, 515 (4th Cir. 1974); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1973);
Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 867, 867 (2d Cir. 1967); Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862, 864
(5th Cir. 1966); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 583, 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1966); Hurlburt v. Graham,
323 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1963); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir. 1961).
150. See e.g., Ebert, 505 F.2d at 515.

151. 465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1972).
152. 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974).
153. Hilliard, 465 F.2d at 1216.
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prosecuting attorney, when acting in his official capacity, is immune from suit
for damages" that immunity is "not absolute"l54 and concluded that because the
prosecutor is a "quasi-judicial" officer, his "acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction" were not sheltered from liability.155 The court reasoned that
prosecutorial immunity was not a product of the officer's "formal association

with the judicial process," but was applied in light of the discretion exercised by
prosecutors and the need for insulation from liability to promote "courageous
exercise" of those discretionary functions.i15 But when "an official is not called
upon to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial discretion, courts have properly
refused to extend to him the protection of absolute judicial immunity." 57 The
court cited the American Bar Association ethics code and held that the alleged
misconduct of the prosecutor was "beyond the scope of duties constituting an
integral part of the judicial process."' 58

'

In Mulhearn, the plaintiff brought an action against Massachusetts police
officers and prosecutors, alleging that perjured testimony was used to secure a
search warrant and that the presence of an illegal wiretap in the plaintiff s home
was intentionally concealed during the criminal trial.1 59 The court rejected the
prosecutors' argument that they were cloaked with absolute immunity from suit
"when acting within their quasi-judicial capacity," observing the conventional
distinction between prosecutors' advocacy-related and investigatory acts. 6 0 But
the court noted that both the police and the prosecutors shared responsibility for
the flawed search warrant, concluding that "it would be wrong to hold the
officers liable but the State's Attorney exempt."' 6
While the weight of the appellate case law demonstrated an acceptance of
absolute immunity protection for prosecutors analogous to that which protected
judges, these two cases demonstrated an alternative interpretation and approach
based on two important distinctions. First, prosecutors are dramatically different
from judges and the justifications for immunity that apply to one do not

Id. at 1217.
155. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 129 (5th Cir. 1955)).
156. Id. (quoting McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972)).
154.

157. Id.
158. Id. at 1217-18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251 (1st Cir. 1974).
160. Id. at 1256; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles
and Recent Developments, 24 TOURO L. REV. 473, 475 (2008) ("A second general principle is

that absolute immunity goes to the task, not to the office. This means a couple of things. Even
office holders who are protected by absolute immunity only receive absolute immunity for
certain tasks, not all of them. For instance, prosecutors have absolute immunity, but only for
prosecutorial actions; judges have absolute immunity for their judicial acts, but not for
administrative acts; legislators have absolute immunity for their legislative functions, but not
for administrative tasks.").

161. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d at 1256.
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necessarily apply to the other.1 62 And second, a more apt comparison for the
functions performed by prosecutors might be police officers 63 and that the
qualified immunity protection enjoyed by police might be appropriately applied
to prosecutors as well. 164
2. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court finally reached the question of the scope of prosecutorial
immunity after this flurry of appellate treatment of the issue.1 65 Along the lines
of the majority of these lower court cases, the Court extended the analysis it had
66
already applied to the assessment of the scope of immunity for legislators' and
67
judges' in response to constitutional tort claims, to prosecutors.
In Imbler v. Pachtman,'68 the Los Angeles District Attorney prosecuted Paul
Imbler for first-degree felony murder on the strength of the testimony of three
witnesses.' 69 Imbler testified that he was not at the scene of the crime, but the
jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to death.1 70 Soon after the trial,
evidence was discovered that supported Imbler's alibi and cast doubt on the
testimony of one of the eyewitnesses. 7 ' In a subsequent habeas action, the
United States District Court found that the prosecution had intentionally used
false or misleading testimony and had suppressed favorable evidence during
Imbler's trial.1 72 The state of California released Imbler after its appeal to the
7
Ninth Circuit was denied.

162.

For

a discussion of appropriate immunity defenses based on comparisons of

prosecutorial action to that of police and prosecutors see Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 22124.
163. See Chemerinsky, supra note 160, at 494 (noting that while police officers are
generally protected by qualified immunity in suits seeking damages, they are covered by
absolute immunity for damages arising out of their in-court testimony).
164. See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 222 ("The pressure to deny absolute immunity for
investigative acts is especially great when police and prosecutors perform the same functions.
In that circumstance, extending absolute immunity only to prosecutors would look too much
like class-based adjudication, or, in Justice Rehnquist's gentler phrasing, an especially keen
judicial sensitivity to the difficulties faced by lawyers and judges." (citing Butz v. Economou,

438 U.S. 478, 528 n.* (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part))).
165. See Chemerinsky, supra note 160, at 477-82 (surveying the Supreme Court's
treatment of absolute immunity defenses for prosecutors).

166. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 369, 379 (1951).
167. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
168. 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id.
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Imbler then filed a Section 1983 action and the district court granted the
prosecutor's motion to dismiss, observing that "public prosecutors repeatedly
had been held immune from civil liability for 'acts done as part of their traditional
official functions."'l 74 The Court of Appeals, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed
the district court, holding that violations alleged by Imbler were committed
"during prosecutorial activities which can only be characterized as an integral
part of the judicial process." The majority elaborated, closely mirroring Judge
Hand's opinion in Gregoire, holding that the "protection given a prosecutor
acting in his quasi-judicial role protects not simply the prosecutor, but, more
importantly, the effective operation of the judicial process, and hence the
'common good.' Because both the honest and dishonest are insulated, on
occasion an injury without redress inevitably results."l 75
Circuit Judge John Kilkenny dissented from the panel opinion,1 76 citing a
Supreme Court opinion from earlier that same year 177 which held that high level
executive officials do not have absolute immunity from civil liability pursuant to
Section 1983 because to allow such a blanket limitation would leave the statute
"drained of meaning." 78 Judge Kilkenny argued: "it must necessarily follow that
a prosecuting attorney, shielded only by a form ofjudicial immunity, should not
be elevated to a status which would place him above the chief executive officer
of his state. Otherwise, the office of the district attorney, rather than the
Constitution of the United States, becomes the Supreme Law of the Land....
State officials in these circumstances should not escape the paramount authority
of the Federal Constitution." 79 Judge Kilkenny said that he would have held that
the prosecutor "acted entirely outside the scope of his jurisdiction and should not
be permitted to shelter himself from liability by a plea that he was acting under
the immunity of his office . . . It is time to recognize that prosecutors are not
entirely above the law which holds other individuals financially accountable for
their intentional misdeeds."' 80
In affirming the panel majority, the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by
174. Id. at 416.

175. Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1303 (9th Cir. 1974).
176. Id. at 1304 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) ("Although appellant's 22 page complaint,
with 23 pages of exhibits, is admittedly repetitious and in places ambiguous, there is no
question that it charges appellee, Pachtman, with knowingly, willfully and maliciously using
eight different items of false material testimony in securing appellant's initial conviction. It
this is true, I believe that appellee violated appellant's procedural due process rights, and that
he should be stripped of his official or representative character and subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual conduct.").

177. Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)).
178. Id. at 1305 ("To now hold . . that the knowing, willful and malicious use of
perjured testimony to gain a conviction, even though accomplished during the course of a trial,
constitutes an integral part of the judicial process, flies in the very face of the integrity sought
to be protected by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity.").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1306 (emphasis omitted).
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Justice Lewis Powell, acknowledged that Section 1983 "creates a species of tort
liability that on its face admits of no immunities"' 8 ' but cited the prevailing
judicial treatment that Congress had not intended to abrogate "those immunities
which historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded to various
categories of officials," and that the statute must "be read in harmony with
general principles of tort immunities and defenses than in derogation of them."' 82
Justice Powell referenced the several appellate courts that had reached the
question noting that they were "virtually unanimous that a prosecutor enjoys
absolute immunity from Section 1983 suits for damages when he acts within the
scope of his prosecutorial duties"' 8 3 based on the "quasi-judicial" character of
prosecutorial activities, holding that the immunity was "derivative of the
immunity of judges recognized in Pierson v. Ray."184
Imbler challenged this conclusion, arguing that given the nature of a
prosecutor's function and duties, prosecutors should be extended the same
"qualified" immunity traditionally applied to police officers and other officials
with executive duties. 8 5 The majority rejected this argument based on its
"considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official
at common law and the interests behind it."' 86 The "interests behind it" referred
to what I have called the "simple" and "complex nuisance" concerns:
The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same
considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand
jurors acting within the scope of their duties. These include concern that
harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's
energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his
decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his
public trust.1 87
181. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-18 (1976) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 369, 382-83
(1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
182. Id. at 418.
183. Id. at 420 (citing Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1975);
Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 515 (4th Cir. 1974); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249,
1255-56 (1st Cir. 1974); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1973); Fanale v.
Sheehy, 385 F.2d 867, 867 (2d Cir. 1967); Carmack v. Gibson, 363 F.2d 862, 863-64 (5th Cir.
1966); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 583, 583 (3d Cir. 1966); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492,
493 (10thCir. 1961).
184. Id. (citation omitted).
185. Id. at 420-21.
186. Id. at 421.
187. Id. at 422-24 (citing Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 593, 597 (Cal. App. 1935) ("The
office of the public prosecutor is one which must be administered with courage and
independence. Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom he
accuses and fails to convict? ... The apprehension of such consequences would tend toward
great uneasiness and toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy which should
characterize the administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor would thus be
impeded, and we would have moved away from the desired objective of stricter and fairer law
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Later in the opinion, Justice Powell focused specifically on the simple
nuisance concern, noting that prosecutors "inevitably make[] many decisions that
could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation. Defending these
decisions . . . could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor
responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials."iss As to the
complex nuisance issues (and their broader social impact) Justice Powell
discussed another, the impact that the fear of subsequent litigation challenging
prosecutors' actions would have on the performance of their duties:
[V]eracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt
before and after they testify. . . . If prosecutors were hampered in exercising
their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about the resulting
personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied
relevant evidence. 189
But in response to the argument that qualified immunity would be sufficient
to avoid the "complex" nuisance problem, Justice Powell addresses the "simple"
nuisance issue instead, holding that qualified immunity would be insufficient to
protect against this problem: "Such suits could be expected with some
frequency[and] if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such
a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be
diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law."l 90 It is critical
that the Supreme Court in Imbler, the foundation of our current prosecutorial
immunity jurisprudence, rejected the application of qualified (instead of
absolute) immunity to prosecutors purely on simple, and not complex, nuisance
grounds. 19 1
Noting the obvious injustice inherent in allowing the injuries suffered as a
result of intentional prosecutorial misconduct to be uncompensated, Justice
Powell recited the alternatives to civil liability that courts had been referencing
for generations: first, that the prosecutors are still subject to the criminal law, 192

enforcement.")).
188. Id. at 425-26.
189. Id. at 426-27. Justice Powell also argued that the potential for civil liability for
prosecutors would undermine the "ultimate fairness of the operation of the system itself'
because the "subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might
result in the prosecutor being called upon to respond in damages" could influence and warp
post-trial procedures designed to determine if a defendant received a fair trial. Id.
190. Id. at 425.
191. Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless
Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1212-13 ("[T]he Supreme Court emphasized its concern with
frivolous claims and meritless cases, noting that constitutional tort claims "frequently run
against the innocent as well as the guilty," that "ingenious plaintiffs counsel" are able to create
material issues of fact based on scant evidence, and that immunity is necessary to terminate

"insubstantial" suits." (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425)).
192. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429 ("This court has never suggested that the policy
considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them
beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for
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and second, there is the potential for discipline by their professional peers, 193
concluding that these "checks undermine the argument that the imposition of
civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the
constitutional rights of persons accused of crime."l 94
The majority took no position on whether a similar blanket absolute
immunity applies to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast
him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than an
advocate" and reinforced their holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune
from any civil damages arising from his "initiating a prosecution and in
presenting the State's case."1'9 The Court did not explain, however, why the
concern that prosecutorial activity will be undermined and altered by the fear of
liability, even for intentional violations of constitutional rights in the course of
the presentation of case at trial, does not apply to conduct at the equally vital
stage of pre-trial investigation. 196
Justice White concurred but wrote separately to express his concern that the
majority opinion could be read to extend a broader immunity for prosecutors than
existed at common law and to reinforce the point that preventing or limiting what
constitutes "simple nuisance" was not a sufficient justification for absolute
immunity.1 97 In fleshing out the "policy reasons" justifying absolute immunity
protection, White focused on the "complex nuisance" problem and the concern
that "such immunity is necessary to protect the decision-making process in which
the official is engaged."' 98 He expressly rejected reliance on any other proffered
policy justifications for absolute immunity, observing that "these adverse
consequences are present with respect to suits against policemen, school
teachers, and other executives, and have never before been thought sufficient to
99
immunize an official absolutely no matter how outrageous his conduct."'

centuries, could be punished criminally.").
193. Id. ("Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts
could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by
an association of peers.").
194. Id.
195. Id. at 430-31.

196. See Johns, supra note 12, at 87-88 ("The Court's functional approach to
prosecutorial immunity has created conflicts and confusion as the lower courts attempt to
grapple with the difficult of characterizing prosecutorial misconduct and determining which
immunity applies.").
197. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 433 (White, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 434-35 ("In justifying absolute immunity for certain officials, both at common
law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts have invariably rested their decisions on the
proposition that such immunity is necessary to protect the decision-making process in which
the official is engaged.").
199. Id. at 436 ("The majority articulates other adverse consequences which may result
from permitting suits to be maintained against public officials. Such suits may expose the
official to an unjust damage award . .. such suits will be expensive to defend even if the
official prevails and will take the official's time away from his job . . . and the liability of a
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Therefore, according to Justice White, "unless the threat of suit is also thought
to injure the governmental decision-making process, the other unfortunate
consequences flowing from damage suits against state officials are sufficient
only to extend qualified immunity to the official in question." 200
More recently, in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,20 1 a case in which the Court
applied absolute immunity to shield a prosecutor from a Section 1983 claim, 202
Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous court, referenced Judge Hand's
"balance" of "evils" discussion in Gregoire and noted that the Supreme Court
has applied absolute immunity for prosecutors particularly when prosecutors'
actions "are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process." 203 He clearly distinguished between the simple and complex nuisance:
the "general common-law concern that harassment by unfounded litigation could
both cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties
[simple] and also lead the prosecutor to shade his decisions instead of exercising
the independence ofjudgment required by his public trust [complex]." 204 Justice
Breyer concluded that the "very reasons" that supported Judge Hand's opinion
in Gregoire support application of absolute immunity in the case, noting that
"sometimes such immunity deprives a plaintiff of compensation that he
undoubtedly merits but the impediments to the fair, efficient functioning of a
prosecutorial office that liability could create lead us to find that Imbler must
205
apply here."

prosecutor for unconstitutional behavior might induce a federal court in a habeas corpus
proceeding to deny a valid constitutional claim in order to protect the prosecutor . . . .").
200. Id. at 437, 442 ("[I]t is by no means true that such blanket absolute immunity is
necessary or even helpful in protecting the judicial process. It should hardly need stating that,
ordinarily, liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very
desirable effect of deterring such conduct. Indeed, this was precisely the proposition upon
which § 1983 was enacted . . . [O]ne would expect that the judicial process would be protected
- and indeed its integrity enhanced-by denial of immunity to prosecutors who engage in
unconstitutional conduct.").

201. 555 U.S. 335, 338 (2009).
202. Id at 349.
203. Id. at 340-41 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).
204. Id. at 341-42 ("The 'public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer' were the
prosecutor to have in mind his 'own potential' damages 'liability' when making prosecutorial
decisions-as he might well were he subject to § 1983 liability... . This is no small concern,
given the frequency with which criminal defendants bring such suits . . . and the 'substantial
danger of liability even to the honest prosecutor' that such suits pose when they survive pretrial

dismissal ..... (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423)).
205. Id. at 348.
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III.THE END OF ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY

A. Absolute Immunity and the "Nuisance Factors"
From its first discussion of limits on the liability of some government
officers, starting with judges in Bradley and moving on to legislators in Tenney
and finally prosecutors in Imbler, the Supreme Court has consistently relied on
what is commonly referred to as the "policy" basis for these limits-the notion
that allowing for such liability will alter and harm the criminal justice process.
But this policy basis is actually two distinct concepts with different potential
consequences and different solutions. Perhaps the central flaw in the Court's
prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence, particularly in Justice Powell's decision
in Imbler, in addition to its fanciful reliance on means other than civil liability
(criminal prosecution and professional sanction) to discourage prosecutorial
misconduct, has been the conflation of these related but distinct concerns.
Both components of this policy concern the potential negative impact of civil
suits filed against prosecutors by the very people they have previously
prosecuted. Courts have referenced "policy" justifications to support application
of absolute immunity to prosecutors for decades 206 but have never effectively
differentiated between the two distinct kinds of nuisance concerns which I call
"simple" and "complex" nuisance.
The problem with the treatment of these distinct concerns as if they were the
same is that courts have traditionally applied one remedy-the absolute
preclusion of exposure to liability for prosecutors regardless of the nature of the
misconduct-to prevent either or both. But absolute prosecutorial immunity is
an excessive and unnecessary tool to limit simple nuisance and it overcorrects
for the complex nuisance problem, which can be readily addressed by the
207
qualified immunity defense.

206. See, e.g., id at 341-42 ("Where § 1983 actions are at issue ... both sets of concerns
are present and serious. The 'public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer' were the
prosecutor to have in mind his 'own potential' damages 'liability' when making prosecutorial
decisions . . . . 'Defending these decisions ...

could impose unique and intolerable burdens

upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials."' (quoting
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-26)).
207. See Johns, supra note 12, at 55-56 ("But contrary to this policy argument, absolute
immunity is not needed to prevent frivolous litigation or to protect the judicial process.
Absolute immunity protects the dishonest prosecutor but is unnecessary to protect the honest
prosecutor since the requirements for establishing a cause of action and the defense of qualified
immunity will protect all but the most incompetent and willful wrongdoers."); see also Jeffries,
Jr., supra note 34, at 251 ("As thus interpreted, Harlow announced a change in substantive
law, but it aimed at a change in procedure. It sought to accelerate the dismissal of insubstantial
suits and thus to protect government officers not only from liability but also from the burdens
of discovery and trial. Implicitly, Harlow changed civil practice for constitutional tort actions.
It encouraged judges to decide cases before discovery and to be far more forward in resolving
the factual predicate for legal conclusions than is customary in American civil litigation.").
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The simple nuisance problem is essentially unrelated to the ultimate
resolution of the lawsuit. The premise of the concern is that prosecutors will be
subjected to baseless lawsuits that they will ultimately win but will have to waste
their (and their community's) time resolving. Essential to this concern is the
expected prevalence of frivolous claims, as no one-certainly not Judge Hand-

would accept as a policy basis for blanket immunity for damages in civil claims,
the argument that prosecutors will be distracted from their duties by an
overwhelming number of valid allegations of their intentional misconduct. 208 As
Judge Hand observed in Gregoire, "if it were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. "209
The avoidance of simple nuisance requires either that frivolous lawsuits
against prosecutors be effectively discouraged or that such claims be dismissed
quickly with limited expenditure of time and resources. While Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 was designed (particularly after its amendment in 1983) to
perform the former function, 2 10 the debate rages on as to its relative
effectiveness, 21 1particularly in light of further amendment in 1993 creating "safe
harbor" provisions. 212 But, expressly in response to the perceived inability of the

208. See Christopher M. Fairman, HeightenedPleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 567, 580
(2002) ("Federal courts began to impose a heightened pleading requirement in § 1983
cases ...
fueled by concerns over burgeoning dockets and a perception of recurring
frivolousness. Heightened pleading then proliferated in the context of qualified immunity for
government actors and their protection from vexatious litigation . . . [and a] reformulated
qualified immunity doctrine and the Court's admonition to prevent disruptive discovery
provided a new basis for heightened pleading.").

209. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d. Cir. 1949).
210. See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 589, 593
(1998) ("[I]n 1983, a series of amendments were adopted. As with the 1980 amendments, the
new provisions were intended to improve the conduct of civil litigation in the federal courts...
. From an academic perspective, the sanctions amendments represented more than a subtle
shift in procedural thinking. After years of trying to cope with the expense and delays
purportedly caused by notice pleading and liberal discovery, the courts and many litigants
sought a return to pre-1938 fact pleading."). See generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 362 (3d ed. 2006) ("The original design of the
[Federal] Rules to increase access and simplify procedure also made it easier for people to file
unmerited, even frivolous, cases. Rule 11, framed in terms of the lawyer's duty to the court,
was intended, from the first, to deal with this problem. It provided for striking pleadings filed
for 'delay' or without good ground to support them.").
211. See, e.g., Maureen N. Armour, PracticeMakes Perfect:JudicialDiscretionand the
1983 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 678-79 (1996) ("Rule 11, like so many
other judicial reforms, has been a lightning rod for 'arguments about the meaning of courts as
institutions."'); Charles Yablon, Hindsight, Regret, and Safe Harbors in Rule 11 Litigation,

37 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 599, 600-04 (2004) ("There is a general consensus that the 1993
amendments to Rule 11 reduced both the likelihood that monetary actions will be imposed on
lawyers and parties for making frivolous filings as well as the severity of those sanctions.").
212. Compare Yablon, supra note 211, at 600 ("[T]he 1993 revisions to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Advisory Committee believed 'should reduce the
number of motions for sanctions presented to the court,' appear to have done precisely that."),
with Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule II of the FederalRules of
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federal court system to avoid exorbitant discovery costs in all but the most
baseless claims, the Supreme Court, following a strong tradition of concern on
the part of earlier justices about the impact of the discovery process on the legal
profession, 2 13 substantially enhanced the likelihood that baseless claims could be
dismissed at an early stage before the onset of discovery. 214 Absolute immunity
certainly discourages frivolous lawsuits and makes them easy to dismiss, but it
does so in much the same way that amputating a leg would cure a sprained
ankle-the solution is effective but wildly excessive and incongruous given the
actual problem.
And while complex nuisance does justify some limits on liability exposure
for government officials, it does not justify the application of absolute immunity.
Indeed, the public policy arguments used by courts to support the liability
limitation more readily justify an expanded scope of potential liability for
prosecutors who willfully violate the rights of the targets of their prosecution.
The central justification for absolute immunity is that we do not want
consideration of potential civil liability to influence prosecutorial decisionmaking because we don't want prosecutors to be reluctant to pursue otherwise
appropriate courses of action based on a fear of subsequent personal
consequences. But this concern does not apply to willful and intentional acts of
misconduct. Presumably we do want a prosecutor to think twice about pursuing
215
Providing an incentive to
a course of action the he knows to be unlawful.
Civil Procedureand its Impact on FederalCivil Rights PlaintifsAfter the 1993 Amendments,
37 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 3, 110 (2002) (noting that whatever the frequency and impact of Rule
11 sanctions in general civil litigation, "[c]ivil rights plaintiffs are still targeted for Rule 11
sanctions more frequently than other litigants in the federal courts, and they are actually
sanctioned at a much higher rate than any other category of litigant.").
213. See Vairo, supra note 210, at 592-93 ("For decades, criticisms of the civil litigation
process became increasingly loud and frequent. For example, in 1976, then Chief Justice
Warren Burger complained that professionalism had declined and that the costs and delays in
civil litigation had become intolerable. For a time, the focus was on curbing discovery
abuse. . . . In 1980, the Supreme Court adopted discovery rules changes, but they were
characterized by Justice Powell as mere 'tinkering changes.' Moreover, for litigators working
at the time, few noticed much practical difference and business continued as usual. Thus, the
perceived problems did not go away, and the Advisory Committee began to work again at
dealing with the problems the organized bar continued to complain about. The 1983
amendments that resulted, in contrast to the 1980 and earlier amendments, did generate
change.").
214. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) ("It is no answer to
say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out
early in the discovery process through 'careful case management,' . . . given the common
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the
modest side. . . . And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved
by 'careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,' much less 'lucid instructions
to juries. . . .').
215. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (holding that in a suit for damages
arising from unconstitutional behavior, executive officials who exercise their discretion are
only entitled to qualified immunity, subject to exceptional situations where absolute immunity
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prosecutors to act contrary to their understandable instinct in regard to Brady
evidence 216 would promote adherence to this constitutional requirement.2 17 Even
the judicial opinions that apply absolute immunity to prosecutors acknowledge
this point when they note the alternatives to civil liability-the possibilities of
criminal or professional sanction-which they suggest will be sufficient
disincentives for misconduct even absent potential civil liability. 2 18

B. Simple Nuisance and Iqbal
Prior to 2009, "simple" nuisance was a legitimate, if overstated, concern.
Prosecutors were obvious targets for frivolous lawsuits arising from their official
acts, and it was difficult to imagine a mechanism that would allow for the early
dismissal of even the weakest of claims. 219
The existing rules for civil practice in the federal courts had not provided an
effective solution. Rule 11 provided for the quick dismissal of, and sanction for,
frivolous claims, but the effectiveness of the rule was the subject of all but
continuous debate from its promulgation through its major amendments in 1983
and 1993.220 Regardless, the proponents of absolute prosecutorial immunity have
is essential); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) ("A plaintiff who seeks
damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant
official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the
time of the conduct at issue.").
216. See Johns, supra note 12, at 141-43 ("If courts decide that absolute immunity must
persist in the § 1983 framework, they should deny the doctrine's application in .. . cases in
which the prosecutor has suppressed exculpatory evidence . . . . [T]he application of absolute
immunity for Brady violations should be reconsidered for three reasons. First, it extends the
doctrine beyond its proper scope since it is not necessary to protect the judicial system or the
prosecutorial function. Second, it leaves unchecked prosecutorial misconduct that is unlikely
to be addressed by the existing procedural safeguards. And, third, it is inconsistent with the
Court's functional approach to immunity defenses.... The prosecutor who fears liability on
this ground can simply err on the side of caution and disclose more evidence than is actually
required. Marginal evidence-viewed through the eyes of defense counsel-might be the key
to unraveling the case and exonerating the accused.").
217. See Jeffries, Jr., supra note 34, at 230-31 ("Absolute immunity for such actions is
profoundly unwise. In discharging their obligations under Brady, prosecutors act ex parte and
without judicial supervision, usually without correction from opposing counsel, and under
professional and psychological circumstances that vitiate the incentives to comply. Other
remedies are inadequate.").
218. See, supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
219. See e.g., Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514, 515-17 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that
absolute immunity "allows suits to be dismissed on the basis of the complaint without
exploring the underlying facts" and warning that "bare charges of malice are no substitutes for
specific averments, for 'the immunity doctrine would be of little value if such
characterization . . . could force the prosecutor to stand trial"' (quoting Hampton v. City of

Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973))).
220. Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 499, 504-05 (1986) (stating that
sanctions under the old Rule 11 were rarely imposed, and that courts were reluctant to issue
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never taken solace in the ability of Rule 11 to reduce, let alone eliminate, simple
nuisance. Attempts at court-created heightened pleading standards for Section
1983 claims against government officials were thwarted by courts pointing to the
language of Rule 9 and its exclusive statement of the circumstances under which
heightened pleading could be required.22
But in 2009, the United States Supreme Court expressly addressed, and
essentially solved, the "simple" nuisance concern in civil rights claims against
prosecutors with its dramatic re-writing of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
and its standard for the sufficiency of a civil complaint in federal court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.222 The new standard, which relied on the Court's prior decision
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,223 was expressly designed to make it easier to
dismiss claims against prosecutors and high level law enforcement officials with
a low probability of ultimate success prior to discovery. 224 It provides a sufficient
remedy for the simple nuisance concern and makes absolute immunity for
prosecutors in such cases unnecessary, at least as a means of controlling or
preventing simple nuisance. It, coupled with the modern version of the qualified
immunity defense, effectively resets the balance that Judge Hand sought in
Gregoire by precluding factually baseless claims against prosecutors and the
harmful distraction they produce while allowing the liability for the "guilty"
actor who Hand cautioned "should not escape liability for the injuries he may so
cause." 225
The Court's rewriting of Rules 8 and 12 began in 2007 with Twombly and
that opinion's assault on the sufficiency standard set out more than a half-century
before in Conley v. Gibson 226 and, more broadly, on the defining feature of the
sanctions).

221. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1998) ("Neither the text of

§ 1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide any
support for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the
summary judgment stage or in the trial itself. The same might be said of the qualified immunity
defense .... The unprecedented change made by the Court of Appeals in this case, however,
lacks any common-law pedigree and alters the cause of actions itself in a way that undermines
the very purpose of § 1983-to provide a remedy for the violation of federal rights.").

222. 556 U.S. 662, 686-87 (2009).
223. 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007).
224. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 ("Our rejection of the careful-case-management
approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to
assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine
is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive
discovery.' . . . There are serious and legitimate reasons for this. If a Government official is to
devote time to his or her duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is
counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in

litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed.").
225. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
226. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Ponderinglqbal: Iqbal
and the Slide Toward Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 185, 186 (2010) ("Twombly did
away with the 'no set of facts' standard of Conley v. Gibson and introduced the notion that
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves-its replacement of stylized and
restrictive code pleading with simple procedures allowing for "notice
pleading."227 Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter addressed concerns
about the nature of modern civil litigation and the costs and demands it places on
parties (particularly from discovery 228), in terms essentially identical to the
"simple" and "complex" nuisance concerns. 229 Justice Souter noted that "it is
self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by 'careful
scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage"' and that "the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic
cases before reaching those proceedings."230
Justice Souter sought to avoid these concerns by altering the standard for

dismissal under 12(b)(6), 2 3 1 stating that in order to avoid dismissal the plaintiff
Rule 8 requires a claimant to plead facts showing plausible entitlement to relief in order to
survive a motion to dismiss."); Michael Eaton, Comment, The Key to the Courthouse Door:
The Effect of.Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the HeightenedPleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L.

REV. 299, 305-06 (2011) ("With its decision in [Twombly], the Supreme Court seemingly
upended fifty years of case law precedent, which had consistently held that a complaint should
not be dismissed unless it is 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitled him to relief."'); Robert G. Bone, Pleading Rules and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875 (2009) ("Many judges and academic
commentators read the decision as overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading practice,
and critics attack it as a sharp departure from the 'liberal ethos' of the Federal Rules, favoring
decisions 'on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery."').
227. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DuKE L.J. 1, 3 (2010) ("When adopted in 1938, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represented a major break from the common law and code
systems. Although the drafters retained many of the prior procedural conventions, the Federal
Rules reshaped civil litigation to reflect core values of citizen access to the justice system and
adjudication on the merits based on a full disclosure of relevant information.").
228. See id. at 61-62 ("If litigation costs are to be considered in applying the pleading
and motion-to-dismiss rules, all costs should be taken into account, including those borne by
plaintiffs, the expenditure of system resources, and the loss to society from any impairment of
important public policies as a result of non-enforcement. The costs to defendants-in
particular, large corporate and government entities-have been decried frequently. Twombly

justified establishing plausibility pleading on the basis of assumptions about excessive
discovery costs for these organizations and the threat of extortionate settlements.").

229.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) ("That potential expense

is obvious enough in the present case: plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent
of all subscribers to local telephone or high-speed internet service in the continental United
States, in an action against America's largest telecommunications firms (with many thousands
of employees generating reams and gigabytes of business records) for unspecified (if any)
instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over a period of seven years.").
230. Id. ("Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the
level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
[discovery] in cases with no 'reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal
relevant evidence'. . . .").
231. Miller, supra note 227, at 14 ("With the advent of 'plausibility' pleading, the Rule
12(b)(6) motion seems to have stolen center stage. It has become the vehicle of choice for both
disposing of allegedly insufficient claims and protecting defendants from supposedly
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must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action" but allegations sufficient "to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level." 232 In defense of his rejection of the notice
pleading requirement of Rule 8, Justice Souter insisted, incoherently, that
"[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probabilityrequirement at the pleading stage," contradicting this assertion later
in the same sentence by saying that the new Rule 8 sufficiency standard "simply
calls for enough facts to raise a reasonableexpectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of illegal agreement." 233 Given Merriam-Webster's definition of
"probability" as "the chance that a given event will occur" and "expectation" as
"the state of being expected" and "expect" as "to consider probable or certain,"
it is nonsense to suggest that a new plausibility analysis does not impose a new
2 34
probability requirement for complaints at the pleading stage.
Commentators initially disagreed about the full impact of the Twombly
decision,235 however, with some arguing that its holding was limited to civil
claims arising under the federal antitrust laws, 236 or that its impact on actual
excessive discovery costs and resource expenditures-objectives previously thought to be
achievable through the utilization of other rules and judicial practices.").
232. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

233. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
234. See Miller, supra note 227, at 19 ("After Twombly and Iqbal, mere notice ofa claim
for relief likely does not satisfy the Court's newly minted demand for a factual showing.");
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuringthe Impact of PlausibilityPleading, 101 VA. L. REv. 2117,
2128 (2015) ("Despite these changes, the Iqbal and Twombly Courts disclaimed any intent to
adopt a heightened fact pleading standard. Unsurprisingly, however, lower courts are confused

as to the precise ramifications ofthe cases. . . .Iqbal and Twombly adopt 'plausibility' pleading
instead of Conley's notice pleading, taking the relatively distinct roles accorded Rules 8,

12(b)(6) and 12(e), and conflating them to introduce a heightened fact pleading regime in
direct conflict with the original purposes of the Federal Rules."); Bone, supra note 226, at 881
("The term 'plausible' obviously refers to the strength of the inference from allegation to
necessary factual conclusion. It is useful to think about an inference as a conditional
probability . . . . 'Plausible' corresponds to a probability greater than 'possible.' Exactly how
much greater is uncertain.").
235. See Eaton, supranote 226, at 307 ("In the immediate wake of Twombly, there were
questions about the efficacy of the Court's newly adopted "plausibility" standard outside the
antitrust context. Confusion within the legal community was compounded by the Court's
decision in Erickson v. Pardus, in which the Court, just three weeks after Twombly, upheld
the sufficiency of a complaint without mentioning the plausibility standard." (citation
omitted)); Spencer, supra note 226, at 186 ("However, after Twombly there was some
uncertainty regarding whether the case signaled a new era in pleading similar to the seismic
shift in how courts approached pleading before and after the advent of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938. Many observers argued that Twombly did not represent a major
change in pleading doctrine and in any event merely reflected the approach to pleading that
was prevalent among the lower federal courts.").
236. Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the
ParadoxofPleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 906 (2010) ("In responding to the opinion, some
judges agreed with Justice Stevens's view . .. that Twombly 'rewr[o]te the Nation's civil
procedure textbooks and called into doubt the pleading rules of most of its States,' whereas

176

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [XIII:137

pleading practice would be minimal.237 But Iqbal ended serious debate about
whether a new era in civil pleading had begun, 238 and one arguably more
restrictive than even Twombly had announced. 239
Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim from Pakistan, was arrested after the terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001 on immigration related fraud charges along with
approximately 750 other people perceived to be Muslims.

240

Pending trial on the

charges, Iqbal, along with a 180 or more of the original group considered by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation as of "high interest" to their investigation of the
attacks, was detained at the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit
section of the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York.24 1
After pleading guilty to criminal immigration violations and serving a prison
sentence, Iqbal was deported to Pakistan. He later filed a Bivens action against
more than fifty federal investigatory and corrections officials, including FBI
Director Robert Mueller and United States Attorney General John Ashcroft. 242

Iqbal's complaint alleged that the FBI, under the direction of Mueller, "arrested
and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men" and that Ashcroft and Mueller
were the "principal architect" and "instrumental" to "adoption, promulgation and
implementation," respectively, of a "policy of holding post-September-i1th
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement," and that both "'knew
of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject' respondent to
harsh conditions of confinement 'as a matter of policy solely on account of his
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological

interest. "'243
The District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, relying on the
traditional standard for review under FRCP 12(b)(6), as interpreted in Conley,
which held that a complaint should be dismissed only when "'there [is] no set of
facts on which [respondent] would be entitled to relief as against' petitioners." 244

others viewed Twombly fundamentally as an antitrust case and assumed that the case's effects
would begin and end there." (footnote omitted)).
237. Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 1063, 1098 (2009).
238. Eaton, supra note 226 at 299-300 ("With its recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Supreme Court appears to have placed the proverbial final nail in the notice pleading coffin,
accepting the 'plausibility standard' with open arms. The decision has created serious doubts
about the efficacy of the notice pleading system and has raised concerns about plaintiffs'
constitutional rights to access courts.").
239. Spencer, supra note 226 at 192 ("Although Iqbal involves the application of
pleading standards developed previously in Twombly, the Iqbal Court's rejection of Iqbal's
core allegations as too conclusory to be entitled to the assumption of truth reflects a disturbing
extension of the Twombly doctrine in the direction of increased fact skepticism.").

240 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666.
241. Id. at 667.
242. Id. at 667-69 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of

Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
243. Id. at 669.
244. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motion to dismiss;
while that appeal was pending the United States Supreme Court decided
Twombly, in which the Court expressly rejected the Conley language and the
traditional standard for 12(b)(6) motions. 24 5
In response to Ashcroft and Mueller's interlocutory appeal, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the Twombly decision
and held that its new standard for dismissal did not apply in all cases and that it
specifically did not apply to Iqbal's claim, thus affirming the District Court's
denial of the motion to dismiss. 246 In his concurring opinion, Judge Jos6 Cabranes
used the terminology of simple nuisance to support a more demanding pleading
requirement for claims against law enforcement officials, particularly in light of
the 9/11 attacks. He noted that defendants in this and similar suits would "have
to submit to discovery, and possibly to a jury trial . . .. If so, these officials ...
may be required to comply with inherently onerous discovery requests probing,
inter alia, their possible knowledge of actions taken by subordinates . .. at a time
when Ashcroft and Mueller were trying to cope with a national and international
security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic." 247
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions, concluding that the
new Twombly standard for Rule 8(a) and 12(b)(6) did apply to Lqbal's claim and
that pursuant to that standard his claim should have been dismissed. 24 8 The Court
summarized the Twombly standard-"[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face"' 249 _-and experienced the same
difficulty in trying to explain how the new "plausibility standard is not akin to a
'probability' requirement" when the new rule "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." 250 In the majority's view,
"[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitlement to relief."' 251 The majority applied this standard and concluded that
245 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
246. lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2007).
247. Id. at 179 ("Even with the discovery safeguards carefully laid out in Judge
Newman's opinion, it seems that little would prevent other plaintiffs claiming to be aggrieved
by national security programs and policies of the federal government from following the
blueprint laid out by this lawsuit to require officials charged with protecting our nation from
future attacks to submit to prolonged and vexatious discovery process.").
248. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility PleadingRevisited: A Comment on Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 851 (2010) (noting that the plausibility standard arising
out of Iqbal is "significantly stricter than Twombly's"); Kilaru, supra note 236, at 911-12;
Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable:Defining the Plausibility

StandardAfter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. lqbal, 94 MINN. L. REv. 505,
516-17 (2009).
249. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
250. Id. (citation omitted).
251. Id. (emphasis added). Merriam-Webster defines "possibility" as "a chance that
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the complaint "has not 'nudged [Iqbal's] claims' of invidious discrimination
'across the line from conceivable to plausible,"' 2 52 or, in other words, from
possible to more likely than not. 253
The Court stated that while FRCP 8 marked "a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime," the rule did not
"unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions." 254 In rejecting Iqbal's argument that stricter sufficiency
requirements under Rule 8 are unnecessary given that the "basic thrust of the
qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation,
including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery,"' the Court focused on simple
nuisance concerns:
If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the
formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require
the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and
making informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though
necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in
terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government.
The costs of diversion are only magnified when Government officials are
charged with responding to. . . "a national and international security emergency
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic." 255

Evidence demonstrates that Iqbal's plausibility standard is having its
intended effect 256 on litigation in federal court. 257 In the immediate wake of the
something might exist, happen, or be true: the state of a fact being possible." Possibility,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expectation
(last

visited June 3, 2017).
252. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680.
253. See Tymoczko, supra note 248, at 534 (describing Iqbal's "plausibility standard"
as meaning "more likely than any other (plausible) explanation").
254. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 ("While legal conclusions can provide the framework of
a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief").
255. Id. at 685 (citation omitted). The court continued:
It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while
pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to
other parties proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate

in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes
prejudice to their position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery
orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery.

Id. at 685-86.
256. See Miller, supra note 227, at 20 ("The Court's signal was loud and clear. Motions
to dismiss based on Twombly and Iqbal have become routine, and the perception among many
practicing attorneys and commentators is that the grant rate has increased, particularly in civil
rights cases, employment discrimination, private enforcement matters, class actions, and
proceedings brought pro se.").
257. See Kilaru, supra note 236, at 918 ("Twombly and Iqbal do-and if their language
is to be respected, must-impose a heightened pleading standard. While neither case raises the
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decision,
[C]ivil proceduralists and litigators alike watched as the Supreme Court fully
embraced the heightened pleading standard articulated in Twombly as the
proper pleading standard under [Rule 8]. In the first two months following the
decision, litigators cited to Iqbal as grounds for dismissing law suits more than
258
five hundred times in what are now known as "Iqbal motions."

The majority's language in Iqbaljustified the plausibility standard for Rule
8 sufficiency as a solution to the "simple nuisance" problem in the context of the
qualified, not absolute, immunity defense. 259 If the new plausibility standard,
coupled with the qualified immunity defense, is sufficient to resolve the simple
nuisance problem for prosecutors even at the highest levels of government, then
absolute immunity is no longer necessary, at least to address that aspect of the
nuisance concern. Its continued application should not be allowed to restrict
access to justice for the victims of prosecutorial misconduct even more than it
already is. 260

C. "Nuisance" and Qualified Immunity
Professor Margaret Johns and others have proposed the alternative use of the

qualified immunity defense, which already applies to police officers, as one
261
This
possible solution to "the problem of absolute prosecutorial immunity."

pleading requirement for one group of cases relative to others, both raise the pleading
requirement across the board, at least relative to the Conley standard.").
258. Eaton, supra note 226, at 300-01 (citation omitted). "Iqbal has unquestionably
erected substantial barriers to the judicial system for certain plaintiffs that were nonexistent
under the notice pleading regime." Id. See also Reinert, supra note 234, at 2121 ("The data
presented here strongly support the conclusion that dismissal rates have increased significantly
post-Iqbal, and in addition suggest many other troubling consequences of the transition to the
plausibility standard. Based as it is on an analysis of more decisions than any prior research
has canvassed in detail-opinions and orders from more than 4,000 counseled and 1,200 pro
se cases-the results herein have considerable consequences for the ongoing debate about the
impact of the plausibility pleading standard.").
259. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 ("We decline respondent's invitation to relax the
pleading requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally
intrusive discovery. That promise provides especially cold comfort in this pleading context,
where we are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level
officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their
duties." (emphasis added)).
260. See Miller, supra note 227, at 71 ("The Court's establishment of plausibility
pleading, with its emphasis on the need for factual allegations, has a direct impact on the
accessibility of the federal courts to the citizenry in all categories of cases. To a degree not yet
determined, it will chill a potential plaintiff's or lawyer's willingness to institute an action.
And even if one is started, it will result in some possibly meritorious cases being terminated
under Rule 12(b)(6), thereby reducing citizens' ability to employ the nation's courts in a
meaningful fashion.").
261. See Johns, supra note 12, at 76, 104 ("[T]he application of absolute immunity in
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proposal comes in light of the development of qualified immunity over the past
several decades that removed the "subjective" component of the defense and
facilitated the quick dismissal of factually baseless claims against prosecutors. 262
The argument for exclusive use of qualified immunity as a defense in claims
alleging prosecutorial misconduct is bolstered by the enhanced simple nuisance
protection provided by Iqbal's new pleading standard, and by its new focus on
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of claims against prosecutors instead of resolution on
summary judgment, and the associated avoidance of civil discovery and its
associated burdens.
In Pierson v. Ray, 263 the Supreme Court discussed the level of immunity
protection enjoyed by government officials other than legislators, judges, and
prosecutors in response to constitutional claims brought under Section 1983
against judges, prosecutors, and police officers. The Supreme Court upheld the
dismissal of an action against the judge affirming the application of absolute
judicial immunity.264 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Earl Warren then
observed that "[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute
and unqualified immunity" from liability, but considered the officers' argument

that "they should not be liable if they acted in good faith and with probable cause
in making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid." 265 Chief Justice
Warren noted that under the prevailing view, probable cause was a valid defense

prosecutorial misconduct cases misreads history and violates public policy. Qualified
immunity should be uniformly applied in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. . . . It provides
protection for the honest prosecutor from the burden and intimidation of retaliatory litigation,
while affording victims a remedy where the prosecutor has intentionally violated clearly
established constitutional guarantees.").
262. See Reinert, supra note 191, at 1212-14. Professor Reinert described the standard:
Qualified immunity thus plays two significant roles in mapping the terrain of frivolous and

meritless cases. First, . . . qualified immunity is premised largely on the assumption that many
constitutional tort claims are frivolous or meritless. At the same time, qualified immunity
transforms an otherwise meritorious claim of constitutional violation into a meritless one....
[D]efendants can establish the affirmative defense of qualified immunity through one of two
routes: (1) by showing that the defendant's conduct did not violate law that was clearly
established at the time she acted; or (2) by showing that the defendant reasonably believed that

her conduct did not violate clearly established law. If a defendant can prevail on either prong,
then she is entitled to qualified immunity. In other words, a plaintiff may be able to show that
the defendant violated the Constitution, but if the law was not clearly established at the time

of the violation, the plaintiffs complaint will be dismissed.
Id. (citing Johns, supra note 12, at 143).
263. 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
264. Id. at 554 ("This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest is that the judges should be at liberty to
exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences."); but see id. at
558-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that he did not believe "that all judges, under all
circumstances, no matter how outrageous their conduct are immune from suit" under Section
1983).
265. Id. at 555.
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for a claim for false arrest even when the arrestee is later found not guilty. 266
Chief Justice Warren extended the justification for this defense one step further,
acknowledging the complex nuisance concerns involved in making police liable
for their otherwise "reasonable" performance of their duties. 267
The majority rejected the Court of Appeals' reliance on Monroe v. Pape,2 68
holding that in rejecting the defense of police officers sued in that case, "we in
no way intimated that the defense of good faith and probable cause was
foreclosed by the statute." 269 The Court ruled that "the defense of good faith and
probable cause" was available to the police officers, but ordered a new trial to
determine whether the officers "reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest
was constitutional." 270
Subsequent cases confirmed that the two-part "qualified immunity" defense
applied to preclude liability for government officers who acted 1) in good faith,
and 2) with a. reasonable belief that their action was lawful. 271 These cases
applied the defense to governors, 272 mental health officials, 273 and prison guards
and wardens. 274 And in Wood v. Strickland,275 the Court clearly delineated the
dual nature of the test in a claim against school board members, holding that the
defense of qualified immunity does not apply if the official in question "knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if

266. Id.

267. Id. ("A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being
charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being
mulcted in damages if he does. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the same
consideration would seem to require excusing him from liability for acting under a statute that
he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as

applied.").
268. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
269. Ray, 386 U.S. at 555-56 (citing Pape, 365 U.S. 167).
270. Id at 557.
271. See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 459-60 (3d ed.

2009).
272. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974) ("Public officials, whether
governors, mayors or police, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are
needed or who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and
faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Implicit in the idea that officials have some
immunity-absolute or qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err.").

273. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) ("[T]he relevant question
for the jury is whether [the official] 'knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [the
defendant], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to [the defendant]."' (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.

308, 322 (1975))).
274. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1978) (citing Strickland, 420
U.S. at 320).
275. 420 U.S. at 309.
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he took the action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student." 27 6
But this two-part qualified immunity standard provided insufficient
protection against simple nuisance concerns. Specifically, the subjective "good
faith" element of the defense prevented the expeditious dismissal of claims
against government officials by requiring factual investigation, and consequently
extensive discovery, to determine whether the defense applied. The Supreme
Court addressed this problem in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.277 Plaintiffs had filed a
Bivens27 8 claim against former senior White House aides alleging violation of
their statutory and constitutional rights. Defendants argued that discovery had
produced no direct evidence of any wrongful activity on their part. 279 But
plaintiffs offered evidence of what they asserted was a conspiracy to punish them
for their whistle-blowing activities. 28 0 In response to defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the district court ruled that there were genuine issues of
material fact and that the defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity. 281
The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine "the immunity available to senior aides and advisers of the President
of the United States." 282
The Court began with the familiar conflation of the two nuisance concerns,
holding that government officials "are entitled to some form of immunity from
suits for damages [in order to] shield them from undue interference with their

duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." 283 The Court
distinguished the two kinds of governmental immunity defenses it had
recognized-"absolute immunity" "for officials whose special functions or
constitutional status requires complete protection from suit" 284 and "qualified

276. Id. at 322 ("This is not to say that the school board members are charged with
predicting the future course of constitutional law. A compensatory award will be appropriate
only if the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such
disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.").

277. 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1981).
278. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics Agents,

403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
279. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 803-04.
280. Id. at 804-05 ("Petitioner Butterfield also is alleged to have entered the conspiracy
not later than May 1969. Employed as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of
Staff to H.R. Haldeman, Butterfield circulated a White House memorandum in that month in
which he claimed to have learned that Fitzgerald planned to 'blow the whistle' on some
'shoddy purchasing practices' by exposing these practices to public view. Fitzgerald
characterizes this memorandum as evidence that Butterfield had commenced efforts to secure
Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal.").

281. Id. at 805-06.
282. Id. at 806.
283. Id
284. Id. at 807.
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immunity" "[f]or executive officials in general" 285-and noted that while the
"special functions of some officials might require absolute immunity" those
officials who seek application of this blanket liability protection "must bear the
286
burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope."

The Court noted that even in the absence of absolute immunity, "insubstantial
suits need not proceed to trial . .. but can be terminated on a properly supported
motion for summary judgment based on the defense of [qualified] immunity." 287
After rejecting defendants' arguments for application of absolute immunity,
the Court held that "public policy at least mandates an application of the qualified
immunity standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without
resort to trial." 288 The Court referenced to the same "balance between evils" that
Judge Hand discussed in Gregoire,noting that it is this balance that "has required
289
Continuing its
the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers."
reference to Gregoire, the Court observed that "it cannot be disputed seriously
[however] that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guiltyat a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole." 290 The
societal costs it references are simple and complex nuisances:

[T]he expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public
office ... [and] the danger that fear of being sued will "dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials in the

unflinching discharge of their duties."

291

But the Court noted that while qualified immunity was considered "the best
attainable accommodation of competing values" and that it was designed to

"permit insubstantial lawsuits to be quickly terminated," "the dismissal of
insubstantial lawsuits without trial-a factor presupposed in the balance of
competing interests struck by our prior cases-requires adjustment of the 'good

faith' standard established by our decisions." 292
The Court observed that the good faith aspect of the qualified immunity
defense has "both an 'objective' and 'subjective' aspect," 293 and that courts have

2 8 5. Id.

286. Id. at 808.
287. Id. ("Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the
possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for
relief. . . , it should not survive a motion to dismiss.").
288. Id. at 813.
289. Id. at 813-14. (emphasis added) ("The resolution of immunity questions inherently
requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative. In situations of
abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees.").
290. Id. at 814 (footnote omitted).

291. Id. (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
292. Id at 814-15.

293. Id at 815 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)) ("The objective
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traditionally concluded that the defense did not apply to preclude liability if the
official in question "knew or reasonablyshould have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional
rights of the plaintiff, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury."2 94 And it was the
"subjective" element of the defense that the Court identified as the element that
prevents the kind of expeditious resolution of these claims mandated by public

policy:
The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved
incompatible with our admonition . . . that insubstantial claims should not
proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for
summary judgment. And an official's subjective good faith has been considered
to be a question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring
resolution by a jury.295
The Court concluded that notwithstanding its prior articulation of the
qualified immunity defense, "it is now clear that substantial costs attend the

litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials [including]
distraction of officials from their government duties, inhibition of discretionary
action, and deterrence of able people from public service." 296 The majority also
observed that there was something special about this kind of element in a civil
claim, holding that "j]udicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may
entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including
an official's professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly
disruptive of effective government." 29 7

Accordingly, the majority held that the qualified immunity defense should
be altered, that "bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
government officials either to the costs of trial or the burdens of broad-reaching

discovery," and that the defense should apply to officials "insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." 298 The change would serve to
prevent the "excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of
299
many insubstantial claims on summary judgment."

element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for 'basic, unquestioned
constitutional rights.' The subjective component refers to 'permissible intentions."').
294. Id (quoting Strickland, 420 U.S. at 308).
295. Id at 815-16.
296. Id at 816.
297. Id. at 817.
298. Id. at 817-18.
299. Id. at 818-19. ("If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could
not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly
be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was
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The majority in Harlow, faced with an argument that absolute immunity was
necessary to preclude simple and complex nuisance problems, concluded instead
that qualified immunity, modified expressly to reduce the distraction caused by
full litigation of baseless claims, was sufficient to prevent both nuisance
concerns, and constituted the proper balancing of the concerns addressed by
Judge Hand in Gregoire. As the majority stated, the application of this new
objective version of qualified immunity did not provide a
license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct
and in compensation of victims remains protected [and when] an official could
be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or
constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers
injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. 300
There is, of course, no such access to a cause of action for those injured by
the unlawful acts of prosecutors (who, unlike almost all other executive officials,
are protected by absolute immunity) and while there may have been a policy
justification for this limitation under the traditional version of qualified
immunity, that justification does not survive the Court's decision in Harlow.
Five years later, in Anderson v. Creighton,301the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the shift in the qualified immunity defense to a purely objective analysis. The
Court started with the familiar reference to the balancing between the interest of
the potentially injured plaintiff and nuisance concerns, noting that qualified
immunity is the mechanism applied to ensure that balance. 302 It held that the
clearly-established right, whose violation would allow for rejection of the
qualified immunity defense, must be "particularized" 30 3 to the specifics of the
acts in question, it "must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right[, and] in light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness must be apparent." 304
clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonable competent
public official should know the law governing his conduct.").
300. Id. at 819.
301. 483 U.S. 635, 636 (1987).
302. Id. at 638 ("When government officials abuse their offices, 'actions for damages

may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.' On the other
hand, permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs,
including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly
inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814)).

303. Id. at 639-40 ("The operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon
the level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be identified. . . . It should not be
surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have
violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more
relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.").
304. Id. at 646 ("The general rule of qualified immunity is intended to provide
government officials with the ability 'reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give
rise to liability for damages.' Where that rule is applicable, officials can know that they will
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Qualified immunity encourages prosecutors to assess their decisions and
actions and to avoid obvious violations of constitutional rights. It also
discourages reckless or intentional misconduct. This is the proper "balance" for
promoting vigorous prosecutorial conduct while avoiding injury to individual
citizens and the society as a whole.
There is no "complex" nuisance justification for absolute immunity. Any
prosecutor acting in good faith and with reasonable professionalism with regards
to the interests of those accused of crimes will benefit fully from the protection

of qualified immunity in a civil lawsuit by a disgruntled plaintiff with no valid
claims against her. 305 The application of absolute immunity, instead of qualified
immunity, serves to relieve the prosecutor of any fear of liability when she acts
in bad faith or with a grossly negligent performance of her duties. There is no
justification in our legal system for providing such a limitation or in not disincentivizing such activity on the part of government officials cloaked with
almost limitless power over individuals.3 06

CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity coupled with the new plausibility standard for 12(b)(6)
set out in Iqbal provide more than sufficient defense against the threat of simple
nuisance for prosecutors. The combined protection serves all the public policy
concerns that could potentially justify the continued application of the defense
of absolute immunity. This new procedural approach to assessment of the
qualified immunity defense does not prevent all lawsuits against these officials,
but neither does the presence of absolute immunity, as demonstrated by

not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American

law." (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
305. See Johns, supra note 12, at 104 ("Since first adopting the prosecutorial immunity
defense in civil rights actions, the Court has supported absolute prosecutorial immunity on
historical and public policy grounds. But ...
the application of absolute immunity in

prosecutorial misconduct cases misreads history and violates public policy.

. .

. Qualified

immunity is supported by both history and public policy. It provides protection for the honest
prosecutor from the burden and intimidation of retaliatory litigation, while affording the
victims a remedy where the prosecutor has intentionally violated clearly established
constitutional guarantees.").
306. See id. at 121 ("The justification for absolute immunity is that civil rights litigation
will chill the prosecutorial function and unduly burden the government. But the evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct resulting in wrongful convictions suggests that we have sacrificed
the integrity of our criminal justice system for the sake of efficiency. This corruption of our
criminal justice system violates public policy. On the other hand, the elimination of absolute
immunity would serve public policy. As Justice White wrote, 'one would expect that the
judicial process would be protected and indeed its integrity enhanced by denial of immunity
to prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct.' Prosecutors must obey their solemn
obligation to see that justice is done. To insure the integrity of our system ofjustice, those who
violate their duty by trampling on clearly established constitutional rights must be held
accountable." (citation omitted)).
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continued proliferation of civil claims filed against state and federal
prosecutors. 307 Qualified immunity in the context of the new and restrictive
"plausibility" requirement in Iqbal does dissuade all but the most compelling of
claims, and provides an efficient and inexpensive means for the removal of not
only frivolous claims (already policed in our legal system by Rule 11 and similar
state provision), but also claims that involve allegations for which there is an
equally compelling explanation for the prosecutor's conduct that does not
involve a violation of the plaintiffs rights. It certainly cannot be reasonably
argued that the simple nuisance concern should lead to the suppression of clearly
valid claims against government officials when a successful mechanism is in
place for precluding frivolous and invalid lawsuits.
Judge Hand's dilemma in Gregoire was that there was no way to hold
prosecutors responsible for their truly egregious acts without holding the
majority of honest and blameless prosecutors hostage to the twin nuisance
consequences of exposure to civil liability. But with the Iqbal "sufficiency"
standard for complaints, and the objective qualified immunity defense, a new
balance is possible that Will allow what was likely impossible at the time:
preventing a prosecutor from "escap[ing] liability for the injuries he may so
308
cause; and .. . confin[ing] such complaints to the guilty."

307. See Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must
Place Limits on ProsecutorialImmunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 19 (2009) ("[T]he number
of uncovered cases of misconduct seems to be growing, and the misconduct itself is

increasingly brazen.").
308. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).

